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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the kinds of verbal and nonverbal signals elites manifest to show
leadership qualities. Launching from Max Weber’s conceptual framework of charisma as a
power term and Harold Lasswell’s study of propaganda, this study takes a multidisciplinary
approach to studying political leadership with elements of communication methodology and an
ontological basis in evolutionary psychology. The study’s goal is to offer a framework for
defining and evaluating the diverse signal patterns employed by political elites in three real-life
situations. These are the Malta Summit, the 1992 Virginia Presidential Debate, and the 2012
South Carolina Republican Presidential Primary. The cases were chosen because they display a
diverse set of signal variations during different types of interactions.
The three case studies are evaluated by measuring frequency and patterns of occurrence
of the five different interaction constructs (indicator of interest, indicator of disinterest,
demonstration of high value, demonstration of low value, and compliance testing) to explain
different interaction patterns. A simple frequency distribution of the different signals during a
given interaction is used to display the empirical findings and to compare patterns across the case
studies. This study reveals that the presence of DLV (demonstration of low value) signals
weaken an elite’s position in relation to other elites and the public while the presence of DHV
(demonstration of high value) signals strengthen an elite’s position. It is largely the presence,
absence, and frequency of these two signals that determines who conveys leadership qualities
effectively regardless of leadership style. Studying the signaling patterns of political elites would
allow scholars to understand better the kinds of signal patterns and signal frequencies that are
used in different types of leadership styles and norm ranges for signals including for political
elites belonging to different cultures and subcultures.

iii

Dedicated to my family and friends.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge all of those who helped me develop the ideas in this thesis.
First and foremost, thank you to my committee members: Dr. Kerstin Hamann, Dr. David
Houghton, Dr. Roger Handberg, and Dr. Kristin Davis who helped me to put together nebulous
concepts into a practical framework.
To my father and friends who proofread many revisions of this thesis and helped me
develop my ideas and apply them to the political spectrum. And to everyone else who provided
assistance to me in writing this thesis, especially Ari Litwin who has proofread this thesis
countless times through its numerous iterations and helped me synthesize and summarize my
thoughts.
Thank you everyone, your help has been greatly appreciated.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
Brief Overview ........................................................................................................................... 1
Significance of Topic .................................................................................................................. 1
Summary of Methodology .......................................................................................................... 3
Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................................................ 5
CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CONTEXT ................................................... 6
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6
Leadership Styles, Context, & Epistemology ............................................................................. 7
Charisma: Weber and the Establishment ................................................................................ 7
Propaganda: Political Persuasion .......................................................................................... 12
Elites: Frame of Reference Controllers................................................................................. 15
Practical Applications & Computer Science Analogies ........................................................ 16
Definitions of Interaction Variables .......................................................................................... 18
Explanations & Frameworks of Analysis of Interaction ....................................................... 21
Core Signals .............................................................................................................................. 26
Universal Signals & Baselines .............................................................................................. 29
Darwin & Innate Behavior .................................................................................................... 31
The Effect of Culture ............................................................................................................ 32

vi

Preventing Conflict ................................................................................................................... 34
Congruence Testing Online and Personally .............................................................................. 35
Implimentation of Concepts in Other Fields of Study .............................................................. 36
Tempo and Baselines ................................................................................................................ 37
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 38
CHAPTER THREE: CODING RULES, METHODOLOGY, & UNCOVERING OF
INTERACTION PATTERNS ....................................................................................................... 41
Transcript Formatting Procedures ............................................................................................. 41
Decision Rules for Coding Variables ........................................................................................ 44
Accounting for Deception ......................................................................................................... 46
CHAPTER FOUR: DIAGRAMS & EXPLANATIONS .............................................................. 48
Malta Summit Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables............................................... 48
Richmond, VA Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables .............................................. 54
South Carolina Primary Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables................................ 58
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 63
Practical Applications & Discussion......................................................................................... 64
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 68
Preface ...................................................................................................................................... 68
How Frameworks Fared When Tested ...................................................................................... 69
Future Work & Limitations ....................................................................................................... 74
APPENDIX A: MALTA SUMMIT TRANSCRIPT ..................................................................... 78
APPENDIX B: PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE IN RICHMOND VA 1992 TRANSCRIPT .......... 134
APPENDIX C: PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY SOUTH CAROLINA 2012 TRANSCRIPT ...... 141

vii

APPENDIX D: INDEX OF INTERACTION VARIABLES ..................................................... 147
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 154

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Simplified Model of Negative Reciprocated Behavior .................................................. 25
Figure 2: Expected Model of Conflict-Free Social Interaction .................................................... 25

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Appendix A Final Signal Codes ...................................................................................... 49
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes Malta Summit........................................ 52
Table 3: Appendix B Final Signal Codes ...................................................................................... 55
Table 4: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes Richmond, VA ....................................... 57
Table 5: Appendix C Final Signal Codes ...................................................................................... 59
Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes South Carolina ...................................... 61
Table 7: Excerpt from Appendix D ............................................................................................... 71
Table 8: Interaction Variables Coded Numerically ....................................................................... 75
Table 9: Malta Summit Coding ................................................................................................... 148
Table 10: Presidential Debate In Richmond VA 1992 Coding.................................................... 152
Table 11: Presidential Primary South Carolina 2012 Coding ..................................................... 153

x

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Brief Overview
Humans and nonhuman primates use comparable nonverbal signals in social contexts that
are manifestations of discrete emotions indicating social behavioral intent (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989;
Salter, 2007). If social signals evoking emotion can be measured, replicated, and retransmitted,
can political leaders use them to manipulate the public? Politicians in high offices, like United
States Members of Congress and the Senate, take acting classes once they are elected
(Anonymous, personal interview February 11, 2013). These political leaders are, to the best of
their ability, seeking to fine-tune their emissions of social cues. What kinds of signal patterns
emitted by political elites show leadership qualities?
This thesis seeks to work out clear conceptual definitions to measure social signals and
evaluate how political elites use verbal and nonverbal cues to elicit desired (and sometimes
undesired) responses. However, it is outside the scope of this study to measure to what extent
these leadership qualities elicit desired responses, directly affect voting behavior, or how specific
signal patterns relate to a particular leadership style.

Significance of Topic
Political leaders want to know what to do to get what they want. We as political scholars
want to tell when and how political elites employ signal patterns that effectively market their
own leadership qualities to the public. Unlike psychologists who study emotions for their own
sake, political scientists are concerned with emotions only if they further our understanding of
politics (Neuman, et. al. 2007, p. 316). The method for evaluating elites’ signal patterns provides
a fresh approach to the study of elite behavior. This study builds a series of definitions and a
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system that allows us to evaluate the way political leaders express verbal and non-verbal signal
patterns those around them through three case studies. This thesis uses both verbal and nonverbal
communication cues from Odom’s (2008) rudimentary system for conveying intended emotions
in the social setting.
Unlike other approaches to studying political elites, this study does not try to categorize
elites by type or leadership style. Nor does this approach only look for the presence of catalysts
or variables to indicate the manifestation of leadership qualities but also for the absence of
inhibitor signals that disable the elite’s ability to lead. The case studies were evaluated by
measuring frequency and patterns of occurrence of the five interaction constructs operationalized
and discussed at length in Chapter Two. Certain combinations of these variables indicate the
presence of leadership qualities allowing for empirical evaluation of instances where they are
utilized and placed in historical context. While manipulation, charisma, propaganda, and
numerous cultural and subcultural details are discussed in this thesis, they are used only as
frames of reference. The thesis is not designed to explain how a politician with a propagandist
leadership style differs from one with a charismatic leadership style. Rather it shows how two
politicians with greatly differing leadership styles like Newt Gingrich and Bill Clinton for
example still use the same DHV signals in contrast to their opponents.
This study posits that studying the actions of political leaders by becoming aware of
manipulation of social cues, scholars can lead to increased awareness not only of personal
subconscious signals but also the empirical study of both authoritarian and democratic leaders of
varying leadership styles under a unified measurement system. The system described in this
thesis enables the analyst to baseline behavior of individuals against norms for the given
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subgroup (both gendered and cultural) of the individual for more accurate measurement of
emotions.

Summary of Methodology
This study uses transcripts of spoken material and transcripts of videos along with the
videos themselves to discover patterns of behavior and social signals. The transcript only
material is of the Malta Summit between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W.
Bush and their colleagues. The second video and video transcripts are of the interactions of
participants in the Presidential Debate in Richmond between Ross Perot, George H.W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. The second video and video transcripts are of the interactions of participants in the
South Carolina Primary of 2012 between Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, and Ron
Paul. We know from the context of the discussion what the goals of the politicians are. The
interaction variables defined in Chapter Two define what signals the politician is actually
emitting. The study examines how the politicians emit certain patterns in the social signals based
on what the moderator or other elite(s) are emitting. For instance, if the politician wants to
convince the audience of his or her efficacy, then emits incongruent signals (reactiveness, stress,
insecurity), then the audience is not likely to believe that candidate.
Social signals are the independent variables leading to the dependent variables of desired
reactions. These social signals are evaluated through a “black box” of patterns based on the
definitions discussed in Chapter Two. These definitions allow us to measure the efficacy of
leadership qualities in elites’ social cues. For the purposes of this study, we will not examine
follower to follower interactions because they would not encompass the study of political elites.
Certainly, there are more complex variations of the groups present within the interaction. For
example, sometimes (as in the Presidential Debate in Richmond in 1992) politicians allow
3

audience participants to frame the discussion and then fall into the trap of a Follower/Follower
style interaction where the politician’s signals become ineffective. This is because the politician
does not use the Follower’s frame to display leadership qualities.
All of the possibilities regarding signal patterns are probabilistic. Success is not
guaranteed because of other intervening variables like simple policy preferences. Proper
signaling gives the leader the best chance of success but it is not 100% because there may be
other variables at play. For example, a Republican can use all the right signaling to a liberal
audience and even be personally liked by the audience. However, the audience’s preference for
liberal policies can still override that politician getting what he/she wants despite correct 1
signaling. Simply, due to these other variables, the best we can hope for a probabilistic set of
outcomes where the best chance of success comes from correct pattern usage.
Political elites essentially throw signals back and forth, sometimes playing off each
other’s frame of reference and sometimes dropping it for convenience of getting one over the
opponent. Acquiescence by Politician A to Politician B’s compliance test is a score for Politician
B. However, it depends on what the goal of the interaction is. If the goal is to win then the
expectation is that Politician B tries to get more points on Politician A. If the goal is instead
cooperation, then they try delicately to balance the point scale with a lot of acquiescence when
face-saving is allowed. The above charts are generalizations for the kinds of signal patterns
emitted by political elites to show leadership qualities. In order to show how the signal patterns
are emitted, we first need to work out clear conceptual definitions.

1

We can infer that the signaling is correct when the Elite addresses the needs of the Followers. For example, the
economy is down and the public wants a leader who will implement policy to stimulate it. The disagreement comes
in when some prefer Keynesian policies and others a more Laissez-faire approach while agreeing on the same basic
need.

4

Structure of the Thesis
In order to break down leadership qualities based on signal patterns and evaluate
leadership styles, this thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter One is an overview of
this research including the research question, significance of the topic and a paired down
explanation of the methodology and data. Chapter Two is a meticulous operationalization of the
signals that make up the patterns found in political elite social interactions. Chapter Two also
contains a literature review and explanation of the theoretical basis underlying these definitions
and the concept of universal social cues. Chapter Three discusses methodology, defining coding
standards, and the logic behind the coding process itself. While the data are in appendices,
Chapter Four is a discussion of the results of applying the system to the transcripts. Finally, the
last chapter discusses the results in a more critical way, concluding with limitations and
implications as well as directions for future research.

5

CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CONTEXT
Introduction
Political elite leadership in political science today has rarely been studied by piecing
together how elites fine-tune social signals for effective message delivery. It has instead studied
by trying to organize elites into certain categories of individuals based on their attributes, past
performance, the mixing of myth and identity, and even framing (Lakoff 2008). Cultural motifs
and identity politics seem to be at the fore of the study of framing (Lakoff 2008, Neuman et. al.
2007) instead of the micro-level analysis of emotions through the investigation of signal patterns.
In other words, there are plenty of books written about the subject matter to be used in a given
set of situations (Laswell 1938, Greene 1998, Pappas 2011) but this thesis focuses more on what
kinds of verbal and nonverbal messages should be given off in the process for effective delivery.
In this chapter there will be a review of charisma, propaganda, manipulation, cultural, and
subcultural contexts. How are these related? They are simply vehicles for the delivery for
patterns of signals. Regardless of the leadership style (from charismatic to propagandist), elites
rely on the same set of core signals for their messages to be effective on followers. As discussed
in Chapter One, because of the followers’ clear policy preferences which are shaped thanks to
long term environmental variables, some signals may be rejected although they are effectively
delivered. One country’s dear charismatic and beloved leader may be seen by outsiders as a
manipulative propagandist madman. How can this be? This is because charisma and
manipulation are merely styles of delivery of what are at the core, the same types of signal
patterns.
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Leadership Styles, Context, & Epistemology
The next three subsections focus on charisma, political manipulation, and propaganda.
Throughout this these concepts are treated as leadership styles as opposed to dependent variables
in their own right. This is because all three depend on the same sort “explosive fuel mixture”
where certain signal patterns are designed to appeal to the elite’s intended target and evoke a
spontaneous emotional response. These are not dependent variables, merely different vehicles to
achieve the same end: compliance with the elite framing the discussion.

Charisma: Weber and the Establishment
The study of charisma has suffered setbacks to its credibility. Despite recent attempts to
resurrect charisma, numerous scholars have called to drop the concept from political science’s
epistemological vocabulary. Regrettably, the general ambiguity of charisma, its indefinite and
ephemeral conceptual classification, and almost the common perception of a mystical personal
magnetism have reduced it a “debased, floating signifier” (Gibson et. al. 1998, Smith 2000).
Before Max Weber wrote on the topic of charisma it used to have theological undertones
(Breuilly 2011, Pappas 2011). Weber separated charisma from its theological roots and gave it
the conceptual connotation of a power term but he treated the term without declaring a clear
operational definition and he never operationalized leadership qualities as they could exist
without charisma. Smith describes Weber’s writings on charisma as “suggestive, elusive,
brilliant, and fragmentary” (2000). Along with formulating the three concepts of legitimate
authority, Weber’s writings suggest two kinds of charisma. One is based on leaders’ abilities to
tap into beliefs about the existence of supernatural powers beyond the natural world. The other is
based on leaders’ abilities to tap into existing beliefs already framed by nationalism and ideology.
This kind of charisma is based on a secular, modern equivalent to the sacred where the leader is
7

superhuman because of his “genius” or some other quality (Breuilly 2011). Political charisma
was linked to the rise of populist leaders (Weyland 1999; Heinisch 2008; Linden
2008) who rely on charisma to attract constituents as opposed to appealing to the divine,
ideological, or institutional (Gurov 2013).
Arthur Schweitzer (1984) argues that charisma relies not only on the leader’s confidence
but also on the followers’ devotion. The validation of charisma requires these two elements work
together and strengthen each other because those subject to authority must recognize the leader
to complete the authentication. In other words, the ruled must acknowledge their ruler in order
for the ruler to have legitimate leadership status. However, this assessment of charisma still has
room for improvement. Even though valid leadership is interactive requiring two-sided
authentication, it is not merely the presence of certain signals (leadership, subjects’ or citizens’
validation, frame control, and so on) but the absence of other signals (overreacting, failing
congruence tests, being needy, and so on) from the ruler. The presence of leadership qualities in
contrast to the followers’ being needy for example creates an even greater power gap for the
leader to fill. These conceptual limitations along with ambiguous operational definitions 2 are
why suggestions have been made to remove charisma from political science’s epistemology.
While this study does not suggest that the intensity of leadership qualities can be measured (yet),
it does suggest that there are certain verbal and nonverbal signals emitted by elites that are
measurable and indicate the presence of leadership qualities. For example, from a leader an open,
relaxed, chest out posture is always better than a closed, guarded, or defensive one. Additionally,
smoother and slower movements are regarded as regal while jerky, fast movements are regarded

2

Weber’s definition of charisma originally hinged on leaders’ abilities to tap into beliefs about the existence of
supernatural powers beyond the natural world and on leaders’ abilities to tap into existing beliefs already framed by
nationalism and ideology. This creates a measurement problem because it is difficult to determine which beliefs in
the supernatural matter enough for policy creation and which
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as not in control (Odom 2008).
Despite recent attempts at conceptual clarification (Eatwell 2006, Pappas 2011), older
established literature describes charisma as analytically useless and incoherent; even worth
removing from serious dialogue about political phenomena. Spinrad (1991, p. 310)
uncompromisingly wrote “Perhaps the total elimination of the charisma concept in serious
discussions would be salutary. In any case, its disappearance in analyses of large-scale political
phenomena would seem to be beneficial.” Schweitzer (1974, p. 150) offers that charisma is
“either overextended or useless for empirical research” concurring with Ake (1966, p. 4) that
then term ‘charismatic leader’ “is by no means…a meaningful analytical distinction.” Similarly
Freidrich (1961, p. 23) discreetly posited that “charismatic leadership is of minor importance
simply because the faith in a transcendent being is not sufficiently strong or general to provide an
adequate basis for legitimizing any political leadership.” Regardless of this rather sharp criticism
of charisma from the 1960s to the 1990s, Patrick Stewart and Pearl Dowe conclude that although
voter choices “[are] confounded by human evolutionary predispositions to distrust those who do
not look like in-group members in combination with powerful historical forces structuring social
dominance relationships, …charisma may be seen as a significant factor in allowing Black
politicians such as Barack Obama to surmount stereotypes concerning leadership capacity”
(Stewart and Dowe 2013, p. 383). This suggests that certain leadership qualities based on
evolutionarily developed selection mechanisms may explain a significant part of how the
electorate selects its leaders although constrained by structure like the legacy of race relations.
Given that the personal magnetism has helped political elites gain power, how do political
leaders manipulate their targets? How are leadership qualities exhibited as patterns of signals to
demonstrate signals of power hidden in plain sight?
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Manipulation: A One-Sided Approach
Eatwell (2006) and Pappas (2011) contend that charisma should be brought back as core
concept in the study of comparative politics. This is a concept that has been studied in one form
or another by political scholars since Max Weber conceptualized it as a power term (Breuilly
2011, Pappas 2011). Unfortunately, the term charisma carries too much epistemological baggage
in addition to requiring two-sided study (both the leader’s and the followers’ signals). The study
of political manipulation allows for a one-sided approach where the leader determines the
relationship which is fundamentally an emotional interchange between the leader and followers
where the leader directs the feelings of the followers guided by environmental and organizational
constraints. Borrowing concepts based on theory in the political communication field and
psychology, this study irons out definitions new to political science based on the theories and
methodologies of nonverbal experts like Tonya Reiman (2007) and Chris Odom (2008) as well
as communication scholars Stephen Littlejohn (1996) and Kristin Davis (2006) that allow for the
measurement of any interaction between two or more individuals or groups. These definitions are
sufficiently broad to encompass not only verbal signals but nonverbal ones as well. The
definitions specified later on in this thesis allow the scholar to analyze behavior with the
methodical nature of a polygraph operator. Spikes in certain variables in the context of specific
baseline behavior allow the scholar to see the manifestation of leadership qualities. Evaluating
when political leaders employ manipulative tactics 3 or manifest leadership qualities can be used
to predict the likelihood of one candidate being picked over another. Indeed, this is already done
with macro-level analysis with theories of emotion guiding how one can best frame emotional
appeals (Neuman et. al. 2007, p. 314).
3

An example of this is framing Presidential debate questions with the frontrunner’s talking points instead of
allowing the underdog(s) to control the flow of the discussion. The implicit message is that the frontrunner’s agenda
is serious and the other candidates are supporting cast members.
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Regardless of the frame of reference under which leadership is studied, there is inherently
an agency versus structure problem. Is the leader unique or is the environment set up in such a
way that any person in the leader’s position has a reasonable chance of achieving similar results
because of the people’s reactions outside stimuli? There are scholars on both sides of the agency
versus structure debate. For instance, Weber asserts that personal qualities of the leader largely
(although not entirely, because of social context) determine a leader’s effectiveness whereas
Schweitzer posits that a leader’s effectiveness is primarily synergistic and relies on peripheral
conditions to manifest (Bradley 1985, Bowden 2010). This study is primarily concerned with
studying leadership from an agency perspective and only peripherally touches on structure.
Regardless of structure, some signals are universally perceived as displaying low social value
and thus subtracting from leadership qualities. These stand in stark contrast to manifestations of
signals that are perceived as not accessible to the ordinary person, and regarded as of divine
origin or as exemplary and attributed to leaders or those with power.
Power is defined by scholars broadly as the ability of one actor to induce another to do
what the second actor would not otherwise do or simply the ability of Actor A to enforce
commands upon Actor B (Barnett 2005, Weber 1978). Power as a whole is very difficult to
quantify and even its conceptual definition largely depends on an actor’s legitimacy. However,
power and legitimacy are linked to a more familiar concept that individuals encounter every day:
social status. As of this writing, social status and soft power have not been linked formally in
political science. However, social status largely depends on showing an individual or group the
ability to attract and persuade others without a show of force. This is for example why celebrities
are often shown with entourages. The perception of an actor’s social status in both the personal
and organizational sense is a key attribute of power (Odom 2008). Demonstrated leadership
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qualities allow an individual domination over another, which can be achieved by using the other
party’s fear, interest, belief, or habit. Often times the concepts of status, soft power 4, and hard
power 5 have overlap. For example, one may not coerce one’s own followers but instead coerce
hostile outsiders in defense of one’s own circle or in-group. While acquiescence lends intrinsic
validity to the one exuding leadership qualities, the effect must be converted into legitimate
authority before the so-called honeymoon period 6 ends and incongruent signals 7 are sent.
Although it is essential that a leader solidify his or her position quickly, those around the leader
will constantly congruence test the leader and each time the elite must demonstrate the capacity
and desire to lead or lose face (Odom 2008) until he or she is unable to lead.

Propaganda: Political Persuasion
In a way this thesis touches the study of propaganda although it is not directly interested
in the war of ideas on ideas. This is because propaganda’s purpose is the “management of
opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulations of social suggestion rather than by altering
other conditions in the environment or in the organism (Lasswell 1938, p. 9).” The interaction
variables discussed later in this chapter offer exciting insights into how to conceptualize and
operationalize social signals evoking emotion. Rather than tackle what kinds of ideas standardize
the civilian mind or how to best organize the consistency of propaganda, this thesis offers a
framework that makes it easier to see how political elites project subliminal messages by
embedding certain values into both nonverbal and verbal behavior. By manifesting certain social

4

The use of direct military force or economic sanction to strong-arm compliance.
The use of cultural, diplomatic, strategic, or economic assistance programs to compel compliance.
6
The honeymoon period refers to the time frame during which the media and the public tend to be very lenient on
the U.S. President because it is his/her first few weeks in office and the cynicism has not set in yet. There is no track
record for judgment so criticism tends to be restrained.
7
For example, an elite may be provoked into overacting which is a show of weakness and inconsistent with other
signals which support the elite’s leadership status.
5
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cues, politicians are able to connect with the public and then mold public perceptions in the way
they see fit.
In Propaganda Technique in the World War Lasswell first defines propaganda and then
proceeds to explain how propaganda is best managed by the state from an organizational
perspective. This is to say how the bodies of government should (or have) organized to keep
oversight and to deploy propaganda on various fronts effectively. Lasswell covers with ample
historical examples how to drive wedges between enemies and keep alliances while maintaining
the illusion of inevitable victory over a demonized and dehumanized enemy. This is a very useful
macro-level analysis, particularly for comparing the effectiveness of propaganda during state
conflict. In contrast, this thesis is more concerned with micro-level interactions that analyze
specific signals that comprise a subliminal message. As George Lakoff (2008, p. 233) aptly puts
it, “if you use the opposition’s frames, even to negate or argue against them, you are helping
them because you are activating their frames in the minds of the public…” This is because using
someone else’s frame activates the appropriate response within the subconscious mind that the
holder of the frame alluded to. Frames of reference, however, are only one type of manifestation
of subliminal signaling which is a core component of propaganda.
Lakoff (2008) concurs with Odom (2008) when he posits that the proper response to an
undesirable frame 8 is the rejection or shift of the frame to fit one’s own worldview (Lakoff 2008,
p. 233). This works so long as the person whose frame has been abandoned does not resist. If he
or she resists then a conflict interaction is likely that makes both discussants look like squabbling
children. The reason for this is that the shifter of the frame of reference has not established with
the opposition why he or she should be given frame control once the opposition already had it.
8

Frame of reference: The core set of suppositions that exist in the subconscious minds of the participants during an
interaction.
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According to Odom (2008), if frame control is not easily ceded then a demonstration of social
value is needed. This can range from simple underreacting to outright resonance with the
opposition’s values. A key lesson covered by Lasswell is that all subliminal messaging including
frame control, in addition to having all the right social cues, must be structured in such a way as
to appear written by the audience for which it is written (Lasswell 1938, p. 33). Therefore, an
effective propagandist does not only try to overpower his or her opponent with discordant frames
to control the interaction. Instead, the objective can be achieved with subtlety by moving the
opponent to a more pliable position with even the smallest of compliance tests until the
opponent’s will is broken. This process is slow, tedious, and usually cannot be done over a single
election cycle if the environmental variables remain static. This is for example why Progressives
push the gun control agenda hardest whenever a publicized tragedy occurs. “The most powerful
time to communicate is when concern and emotions are running at their peak … The debate over
gun violence in America is periodically punctuated by high-profile gun violence incidents
including Columbine, Virginia Tech, Tucson, the Trayvon Martin killing, Aurora and Oak Creek.
When an incident such as these attracts sustained media attention, it creates a unique climate for
our communications efforts (O’Brien 2012 p. 40).”
It is essential for the propagandist to either paint the opposition as incorrigible, wicked,
and perverse (Lasswell 1938, p. 77) or to demonstrate with subliminal signaling that the
opposition is simply weaker and less capable than the propagandist. Stoking deep emotions
correctly in politics can render an image in the public mind that is hard to alter (Neuman et. al.
2007, p. 292). Both Democrats and Republicans use emotional appeals to win elections with
some rather straightforward tactics. They rely on two founding myths that most Americans
readily accept. These are the Pigrims’ social contract and the vision of America as the “chosen
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nation.” These are the foundations upon which identities, norms, and boundaries of culture are
built and the cornerstones of how policy is emotionally framed to the public. However, culture is
not monolithic and over time some values are given different priorities enabling politicians to
have different toolkits for political action throughout each election cycle (Neuman et. al. 2007, p.
292-293). Macro-level approaches like charisma, manipulation, and propaganda which delve into
political persuasion are useful in learning about political choices but as the authors suggest, a
micro-level theory is needed. While this thesis does not accept that challenge of expanding the
theory of affective intelligence, it does propose an alternative way of looking at the interactions
of political elites at the micro-level.

Elites: Frame of Reference Controllers
While reading the preceding three sections, the reader may be confused as to why all of
the above leadership styles cover only elite to follower interactions while the case studies cover
leader to leader interactions with some small interplay from audience participants and
moderators. For the purposes of this study, the term “elite” is malleable and does not exclusively
refer to those who hold a disproportionate amount of wealth or political power. It expands to
include opinion leaders when those who hold a disproportionate amount of wealth or political
power are also involved in the interaction. This is particularly significant when opinion leaders
have a hand in guiding interactions among elites. However, the demarcation does not end there.
Anyone who can capture and sustain the frame of reference of an interaction where those who
hold a disproportionate amount of wealth or political power are involved is temporarily upgraded
to the same status. This seems absurd but unless the common individual discredits him or herself,
the elite continuing the interaction along the commoner’s talking points grants the commoner
legitimacy. He/she who controls the frame makes the rules.
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Practical Applications & Computer Science Analogies
While some of the above scholars see the value in the presence of certain signals like
reframing (e.g. Lakoff, O’Brien), screening for the absence of some “bad” signals (e.g.
neediness, outcome dependency) concurrently with the presence of “good” signals (e.g.
preselection 9) is a useful tool to apply as opposed to either presence or absence of these signals
independently. Some elites act one of various ways on stage, and another way in private (Carney
2012). Often the motivation for certain behavior baffles scholars, and is often written off as
maskerovka 10, as immeasurable phenomena, or even unpredictable behavior (Krastev 2008,
McDermott 2010). This thesis seeks to demonstrate how leadership qualities are exhibited
through signal patterns, and how they can be evaluated by using basic concepts from the
communication field and psychology. Analysis is accomplished by borrowing coding typically
used to evaluate romantically linked dyads, in order to apply these same coding metrics to
diagnose elite behavior. Why might someone like President Lyndon B. Johnson be irresistible
when engaging in one-on-one persuasion and a great communicator in small groups but then be
stiff and unnatural on television? Why might a politician find managing people easy, but sweat
when faced with an algebra problem? A member of the political elite certainly wants to be
successful and is willing to put in long hours to achieve his or her goals. Individuals miss (or
don’t pay attention to) signals that are emitted by people which render them frustrated and
anxious (Odom 2008). This applies most of all when it comes to giving off congruent nonverbal
signals that denote control, grace, and persuasiveness despite being nervous.

9

The idea that we gain an advantage by screening information from the actions and responses of others to other
individuals and products – similar to brand recognition. Therefore an individual surrounded by peers who act like
followers is likely to be seen as exhibiting leadership qualities by outsiders.
10
Russian for feint, disguise, camouflage, and concealment, particularly in reference to the military or political
doctrine of surprise through deceit.
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Consider using a new computer program that returns errors 11 in hexadecimal code. 12 To
the average computer user, who has little experience with these codes, they are simply random
noise. To an IT expert or one proficient with computers this is a coded signal that instructs them
to interact with the machine in a certain way. Surely every person reading this thesis has at some
point felt frustrated by an error thrown by a computer because that error ultimately made one feel
that the signal was useless and there was nothing that could immediately be done to remedy the
situation. Likewise, the reason people feel anxiety and fall into reciprocative conflict behavior is
because they do not know that they are missing signals that should alert them to perform a
particular action when that signal is emitted – whether that signal be emitted by a person or by a
machine. All the person perceives is signal distortion or “noise” and sometimes he/she asks for
an expert to rescue them. First, one has to be conscious of the signal and then know how to
interpret it and respond correctly to break construct known in communication theory as a conflict
loop. 13 Imagine now an adult who has never seen an error code before. The natural reaction for
most is fear, wonder, a sense of helplessness, and perhaps even a hint of shame. This is
synonymous with the fight-or-flight reaction reflex in the brain. Experienced leaders are not
easily goaded into fight-or-flight reactions as supporting actors, nor do they succumb to feelings
of insecurity, which gives leaders the illusion of superhuman qualities and self-control (Odom
2008).
The same situation occurs daily in terms of human communication. Some people are
naturally socially skilled and others simply accept or feel that they are not as graceful or social as

11

Error return/throwing is a computer science term which refers to the occurrence of error codes if some function or
statement in a program is unable to run successfully or ends in an unexpected manner.
12
Hexadecimal code is a positional numeral system with a base of 16. It uses the digits 0-9 to represent values zero
through nine and the letters A-F to represent values ten through fifteen. The reason computers display errors in hex
code is because it is a concise way to express binary digits.
13
Refer to Figure 5 for a diagram.
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others. A natural sees a given signal intuitively and learns over time what to do to respond for
maximum gain. A non-natural simply never knows that useful signals are being thrown and falls
into a basic survival or fight-or-flight reaction. This study explores what exactly those signals are
in terms of political leadership and provides a framework for their analysis. Interpersonal
communication literature (e.g. Smith & Berg 1987, Oetzel & Ting Toomey 2006, and Davis, L.
K., 2006) is focused on understanding and managing conflict often focusing on dyadic
relationships in an attempt to bring order to the ostensible chaos of interactions. This suggests
that there may be a way to “tune-in” to certain signals (be they verbal or non-verbal) in order
to study and understand the signaling patterns of political elites.

Definitions of Interaction Variables
Humans and nonhuman primates use comparable nonverbal signals in social contexts that
are manifestations of discrete emotions indicating social behavioral intent (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989;
Salter, 2007). If social signals evoking emotion can be picked out from transcripts then so can
leadership qualities as some combination of those signals. The following categories of responses
from human interaction are inspired by social dynamics literature (Odom, 2008) but are echoed
in more nuanced ways by the communication field, particularly in the study of dyadic and
romantic relationships (Levenson & Gottman, 1978, Littlejohn, 1996, Oetzel & Ting-Toomey,
2006, Davis 2006). Odom condenses all social interactions (verbal and non-verbal) into five
basic building blocks. The following are derived from Odom (2008), require no specialized
education to understand, and are expanded upon here for clarity: Indicators of interest, indicators
of disinterest, demonstrations of high value, demonstrations of low value, and compliance tests.
They are the determinants for measuring leadership qualities empirically because they allow the
researcher to measure for verbal and nonverbal communication that carries value-laden
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properties such as whether a candidate engenders recognition, positive feelings, and trust in the
followers. These interaction constructs comprise the independent variables while the patterns
formed by the combination of these patterns comprise the dependent variable.
Indicator of Interest (IOI): This is any indicator of a willingness to engage or sustain in
a passive-positive to active-positive interaction with a person or an indicator of wanting
to get approval from another person. Examples include getting a verbal response of “yes”
from someone, a smile or any positive non-defensive non-verbal behavior like a nod,
sexual non-verbal behavior, a change of facing toward an individual from negative or
neutral standing, simply continuing interaction, etc. An IOI can indicate compliance,
attraction, valuing another person more than one’s self in sexual applications, and valuing
another person at least equal in all other applications.
Indicator of Disinterest (IOD): Any indicator that leads to a break in rapport,
disacknowledgment, avoidance, impatience, fear, or resistance. Examples of this behavior
include back turning, hand throws where contact was once maintained (as opposed to
more neutral releases), verbal statements that indicate a desire to terminate
communication prematurely, etc.
Demonstration of High Value (DHV): A demonstration, indirectly through narrative and
consistent non-verbal behavior, of indicators that convey social value. Examples of this
subtlety include, offering to pay for everyone’s drinks at the end of the night (wealth),
appropriate humor (intelligence), walking into a tradeshow with an entourage of cohorts
who show respect and are voluntarily and happily in the leader’s sphere of influence (preselection, peer validation), the ability to ignore or reframe communication that is
obviously circulated with the intention to inflame, provoke, or disrupt one’s leadership
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status (healthy emotional wiring). A more advanced show of value is performed by a
leader who can make those around him/her jump through his/her own conversational
hoops without undue effort, attention-seeking behavior, or outcome dependency.
Organizations also make others jump through hoops to demonstrate value, although
perhaps as a matter of standard operation. For example, the European Union sets rigorous
standards for admission and compliance with their regulations is usually a mark of
quality for the goods and services of the complier. This is akin to membership in an elite
clique. It may seem counterintuitive but when laws and bureaucratic guidelines are set
and obeyed the governing body is manifesting leadership signals. When nobody wants to
join the in-group then there is no value in the group. “A command is legitimate when
obeyed because of its intrinsic validity” (Weber 1978, Breuilly 2011).
Demonstration of Low Value (DLV): This is a demonstration of eagerness to the point
of neediness, outcome dependency, in some cases unnecessary submissiveness, or a
vitriolic, hair trigger reactivity to events that do not warrant such a response (for example
a child throwing a tantrum immediately upon being asked to clean up his/her room).
Examples of DLVs include: Telling a social circle about how cool and expensive one’s
car is with the desire to make them feel good about the story-teller instead of about
themselves, self-deprecating humor, putting others down for one’s own aggrandizement,
offering something that seems like value (wealth, protection, etc.) but in a way that
conveys an obvious non-mutually beneficial arrangement with an agenda, trying too hard
too early, falling for attention-seeking behavior like tantrums, giving compliments too
freely with the desire to get them in return, trying to “make a deal” when no proof of
ability is requested, etc.
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Compliance Test: A conversational or non-verbal hoop through which the speaker may
compel the listener to jump in order to test for whether rapport or trust has been built with
the listener. Passing or failing a compliance test may be indicated through proximity,
touch 14, kinesics 15, or a verbal affirmation. An example of this is when a man and a
woman are speaking and the man steps closer toward the woman and she steps back. This
is a possible indicator of the notion that trust has not yet been established and the woman
feels like her personal space has been intruded upon so she widens the gap. A similar
situation occurs between males although males, depending on dominance and
cultural/subcultural norms, could even remove the offending male from their personal
space by verbal command or by the use of force.

Explanations & Frameworks of Analysis of Interaction
Instead of defining leadership qualities as seemingly superhuman coupled with the
capacity through office or position, this thesis defines a leader as one manifesting DHV signals
without manifesting DLV signals as well as holding or contending for political office. This
explains why an elite can be popular with one group of people but not another. In the presence of
certain groups, the elite may feel intimidated and emit different signals that expose this feeling.
This is why one group can perceive an elite as charismatic while another perceives the same elite
as a demagogue. In a nutshell, this thesis seeks to show how leadership qualities can be measured
and what social signals emitted by those surrounding the leader enhance its effects (namely the
effect of DHV signals) on the followers. The effect of DHV signals is enhanced when the DHV
signals from the leader are contrasted with manifestations of DLV signals from the follower(s).
14

Different cultures perceive touch as communication in varying ways. However, once a baseline has been
established, one can determine what amount of interpersonal touch displays the correct non-verbal message.
15
How people communicate through posture, gesture, stance, and movement.
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This is so because obedience sets into motion example behavior that is acceptable for the group
to replicate and get results and implicitly gives the leader authority and legitimacy. It is outside
the scope of this study to measure to what extent exuded leadership qualities affect voting
behavior.
The following frameworks are general expectations of how elites are likely to behave
based Odom’s (2008) work and generally how the Brown-Levinson Theory of Politeness or more
broadly, facework theory explains humans are likely to behave in fight-or-flight situations or in
situations where face-saving behavior becomes necessary. The frameworks are expected
behavior patterns and act more or less like the hypotheses of this thesis.
Framework 1: DLV-IOD Conflict Cycle
The interaction constructs DLV and IOD cannot mix in repeated sequences or the chance
for termination of interaction, outbreak of conflict, or loss of face value is highly likely. The
person manifesting the DLV signal will lose the greatest amount of face value in a group of
discussants.
Framework 2: IOD Out of Strength; DLV out of Weakness
When an IOD is answered with an IOD the offended is likely to signal repeated IODs or
DLVs. If the offender receives IOD signals (especially when paired with DHV signals) then the
offended perceives his/her position as one of strength relative to the offender. If the offender
receives DLV signals then the offended perceives his/her position as one of weakness relative to
the offender.
Framework 3: L'etat, c'est moi
A threat to one’s social standing, status, perceived or material can and is likely to lead to
the IOD/DLV cycle known in modern communication literature as the negative reciprocated
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behavior or destructive conflict because it can trigger the fight-or-flight reflex. This concept
linked to the fight-or-flight reflex is also known as the Brown-Levinson Theory of Politeness or
more broadly, facework theory (Littlejohn, 1996). Heads of state, diplomats, and other foreign
representatives have two roles. They speak for their respective states as well as themselves as
individuals. Fear of loss of a core security need of the state may provoke a similar reaction and
would essentially be the state level version of loss of social standing. This may make the leader
enter into the IOD/(IOD or DLV) cycle “on behalf of the state.”
Framework 4: Opening with a Compliment, a Risky Move
Beginning interactions by giving the receiver an IOI as opposed to neutrality or an IOD
implicitly awards advantage to the receiver of the IOI. Giving a free IOI lends the receiver an
unspoken edge if the receiver is a stranger. Remember that an IOI can indicate compliance,
attraction, valuing another person more than one’s self in sexual applications, and valuing
another person at least equal in all other applications. However opening with an IOI can be done
in formal situations where the decorum is to treat each other with courtesy, especially among
people of similar social standing or power (i.e. leaders of great powers). The reason is that an IOI
opener lends the stranger receiver an unspoken edge is because simply to approach someone new
connotes that they must have intrinsic value in the eyes of the person giving the IOI.
Framework 5: Compliance Tests – Hoops That Keep Conversations Going
In order to achieve any goal through interaction with others, compliance tests are
necessary bridging elements that determine which direction interaction will take. If the receiver
of a compliance test fails the test by responding with an IOD then tester can reply with any block
except an IOI even at the risk of an IOD loop (conflict). The person who responds with a DLV
implicitly believes that the compliance tester is stronger and will give in or else deception is
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present and he/she is trying to trick the compliance tester with a false reading. The key is to keep
escalating with greater demands until trust is either established or deception is discovered. If
deception is discovered, it is the same thing as the receiver of the compliance test resisting and
failing the test. This can be tested by looking for patterns of interaction when coding transcripts
in conjunction with video recordings (if available) of with the five aforementioned definitions.
See Figure 2 for a visual flowchart of projected behavior.
Framework 6: Signal Frequency Changes as Emotional Benchmarks
Frequency changes of any interaction construct (IOD, IOI, DLV, DHV) indicate changes
of how well or poorly one communicator is receiving and feeling about the way a given
interaction is going.
Framework 7: DHV and DLV Signals as Leadership Markers
Central to this study is the notion that in order for leadership qualities to be made
manifest the person vying for the position must DHV signal without any DLV signals or his/her
forward movement will be checked with resistance. The effect of leadership qualities is
magnified when the DHV signaling individual’s opponents manifest DLV signals particularly
reactivity or neediness when the DHV signaling individual is in a leadership role. This signifies
implicit obedience because it asks for qualification when can be given in the form of a command.
“A command is legitimate when obeyed because of its intrinsic validity” (Weber 1978, Breuilly
2011).
Based on the frameworks the interactions are likely to yield the following patterns where
light grey represents the answering signal by one individual and dark grey represents a signal by
the respondent. Negative reciprocative behavior is cyclical where the one or both respondents are
unable to give each other any kind of validation or recognition for each of their respective
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positions. Generally, the only way to break out of the cycle in Figure 1 is to introduce the DHV
signal and then compliance test out of the loop. Figure 2 is an idealized sort of environment
where leadership will be made manifest, which Odom (2008) recommends interlocutors should
strive for. Real interactions (see appendices for examples) as opposed to idealized ones tend to be
a lot more clipped but are still reminiscent of these flowcharts.

IOD/DLV

IOD

IOD

IOD/DLV
Figure 1 Simplified Model of Negative Reciprocated Behavior

Figure 2: Expected Model of Conflict-Free Social Interaction
Based on Odom (2008, p. 135)
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Core Signals
Reducing leadership merely to the presence of DHV signals is insufficient to determine
which signal pattern is a better indicator of leadership qualities even though these variables are
complex and multifaceted (e.g. personal characteristics, leader-follower relationship, and social
context). Looking for the lack of overreacting, failing congruence tests, being needy, and so on
(in other words DLV signals) in the leader’s actions in conjunction with the presence of
congruent nonverbal behavior (full of DHV signals) is the key to detecting leadership qualities.
This is the crux of how to determine who is the most capable leader in a given interaction. The
elite who most consistently and congruently manifests DHV signals while not emitting any DLV
signals has the best chance of obtaining a leadership position and looking good in a debate or
other such interaction.
A logical question then becomes, why are more elites not taking advantage of this
system? Since there is no codex of which signals lead to which outcomes combined with
probabilistic, environment contained interactions are easy to misjudge. Imagine trying to type on
a keyboard that does not have any letters. Instead, keystrokes perform actions that seem to have
limited success and some are bound in such ways that are uncomfortable to press in a
competitive environment such as fast-paced secretarial work. Indeed at that point successes
would seem like they are based on luck or the divine and failures resigned to fate, which is how
people viewed the qualities of leaders as divinely bestowed before Weber (Pappas 2011).
Imagine now being able to not only know what action each keystroke performed, but to remap
the keyboard to match what is comfortable and natural to one’s preferences. This new system
might not guarantee flawless success since user error is always a factor, but the chances of
success should be greatly bolstered. This would further lead to an expanded capacity to evaluate
the actions of leaders and perhaps even an ability to compel certain reactions when desired at the
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very least in categorical and probabilistic terms. Today political manipulation is often explained
from the lens of a particular cultural outlook or social context (structure) but the kernel of all
political communication, the underlying valuation mechanism, is an unconscious governor that
remains untapped and resigned to the role of instinct. Simply put, demarcating each element of
political communication as outlined in this thesis enables the individual to measure vibes,
intuitions, or instinct empirically. In turn, this enables scholars to map leadership qualities
indirectly through other variables.
A great deal of information is exchanged non-verbally. For example, in Japanese culture
it is polite to slurp during a meal to indicate that the meal is delicious. Cultural differences are
extremely important because a lack of understanding can often lead to the wrong interpretation
of signals and possibly conflict. In the United States, someone with downcast eyes, a serious
expression, and closed posture can indicate that person is unhappy. In Vietnamese culture, this
can mean that they are being deferential and even polite to a superior. It is helpful to know the
range of behaviors that can be interpreted differently by members of foreign cultures or even
group subcultures and be mindful of one’s own non-verbal body language to avoid broadcasting
unintended negative signals (Sadri & Flammia, 2011), and because this constitutes baseline
behavior that must be known to analyze interactions. Understanding subcultures can be crucial
for gauging norms especially for class or professional groups.
While this is true, studying every person’s nuanced response style is overwhelming and a
general classification system is useful. The interpretation of negativity and positivity is different
based on culture or subculture. However, universally, closed body language, downcast eyes, and
a serious expression are associated with submissiveness or defensiveness with respect to an
external force (whether that is seniority/authority or self-protection from environmental
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influences). This universal signal of closed body language is based on biology – a desire to
shield the body from harm, whether real or perceived and stemming from the subconscious mind.
Having a general classification system of responses common among all human beings should
lead to better analysis of elite signal patterns. 16 So there are some signals that are culture-bound
and others that are not. How do we know what is common among all human beings and what is
contextual depending on culture? Neuroscience showed support for the existence of “core” or
“discrete” emotions by linking certain emotions, and their manifestation to activity in distinct
brain regions (Keltner & Ekman, 2003; Keltner, Ekman, Gonzaga, & Beer, 2003; Matsumoto,
Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 2010). The idea of “core” emotional signals has been
around since Charles Darwin first proposed the concept that smiling was universal (1872).
Nonverbal behavior like smiling can indicate submissiveness or friendliness depending on the
type of smile and in conjunction with other nonverbal behavior.
The scope of this study is primarily to analyze and classify events that resemble adaptors
for baseline social programming (largely subconscious expressions of the state of the individual).
The classifications used in this thesis are extremely broadly defined and can be used crossculturally as basic building blocks of communication and the interpretation can be adjusted for
cultural values as necessary accounting for foreign norms. Correct navigation of cultural norms
acts as a catalyst to successful political manipulation but this social context is not a primary
determinant. Like charisma, propaganda, and manipulation successful navigation of cultural
norms is only a vehicle for more effective messaging but the core signal patterns remain the
same whether one interacts with schoolchildren or felons.

16

Note: It is still very useful to have people from foreign cultures assisting during negotiations or events because
unintended offenses can occur. For example, in the Arab world the left hand is considered impure because it is used
for bodily hygiene so one should never use it for trying to pass food to guests when dealing with traditional and
religious Arab guests.
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Universal Signals & Baselines
This study evaluates verbal and nonverbal signals, indicating if they are congruent or not,
and then sequencing them out like programming code and graphically displaying the signal
frequency distributions in Excel spreadsheets to measure whether or not the manipulation of
leadership qualities is being employed. Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System
(FACS) is meant to handle only facial signals (Ekman 2003) whereas the concepts in the thesis
allow for the comparison of verbal, body, tonal, and facial congruence testing, which provide a
rough sketch of the person’s signals without delving into specific subsections of nonverbal
behavior.
The weakness to this approach is that some nonverbal signals may be overlooked because
of their subtlety and speed but the strength is that the system does not fail because of a few
missed signals. In other words, one improperly categorized signal does not render the study
invalid because of the ability to cross reference against other signals like tonal, verbal, body
nonverbal signals, excepting the face. This is similar to how an individual passes a polygraph test
if parts of the results are inconclusive and the polygraph operator does not know that the
interrogated person is not honestly answering the questions.
It seems that none of the systems used to analyze political elites are holistic in terms of
studying behavior as all of the actions of a person’s entire body (as opposed to limited to
exclusively facial (FACS test), verbal, or tonal traits). The Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity
(PONS) test works better but it has a tendency to rate Westerners as having higher sensitivity to
non-verbal stimuli. This suggests that it may not work with universal nonverbal manifestations
alone and expresses cultural bias. Furthermore, there seems to be broad definitions as to what
subliminal stimuli are as shown by Stewart (2008). Stewart suggested that the term RATS was
shown to viewers for one thirteenth of a second and connoted linkage between “RATS”
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“bureaucrats” “democrats” and Al Gore specifically in an advertisement paid for by the
Republican National Committee. While this might have led to an “I see what you did there”
moment among some viewers, this broadens the definition of what subliminal messages are.
Subliminal messages for the purpose of my thesis are not embedded words, pictures, or symbols
displayed in conjunction with concepts or individuals. They are also not backmasking (playing
audio messages backwards) or images flashed for brief milliseconds, too fast for the eye to see.
None of the aforementioned things are universal signals and should not be mistaken for signals
hidden in plain sight for the simple reason that they convey an obvious agenda.
For the purpose of this thesis, subliminal messages are ones that convey enhanced status,
survival capability, or reproductive capability bestowed upon someone for choosing a given side
or a product over another. These are sometimes defined as precognitive stimuli although Stewart
(2008) expressed only the negative elements where concepts negatively affecting survival
(snakes, skulls, massacres) are linked with choices. On the other end of the spectrum, a vice
advertisement might contain a clever play on words, which seems subliminal because it connotes
something sexual. In reality the subliminal part is that the person indulging in the vice on the
advertisement is someone the public aspires to be. This links the vice good as something
someone of high social status would use. One does not have a junkie or addict act as the
spokesperson for a vice good or a new car. This is far more insidious than some easily unmasked
blip in an image or audio clip because it taps directly into our emotional circuitry past the
rational mind. Elites wisely use similar value laden messaging complete with proper framing to
score political wins (Lakoff 2008). This is necessary because “[the emotional] system provides
more finely tuned understanding and appreciation of stimuli, controlling most decision making
and behavior, we do not have to be aware of stimuli to be affected by them (Damasio 1994;
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LeDoux 1996, 53–63; LeDoux, Joseph, and Phelps 2004; Marcus et al. 2000, 35–41). This study
tackles subliminal messages as signals (both verbal and nonverbal), with the five constructs
defining core signals, and explains what sequences of these signals are expressions of leadership
qualities.
This thesis uses three case studies and qualitative analysis to code snippets of interactions
with the five definitions based on the rules in Chapter Three. The definitions in Chapter One are
purposefully broad. A problem with tests like the PONS test and its more modern derivatives is
that it offers overlapping and various emotional categories like cold anger, hot anger, sadness,
despair, disgust, contempt, happiness, elated joy, panic fear, and anxiety. 17 What is the difference
to the layman between contempt and cold anger or happiness and elated joy? The determination
depends on the individual’s personal and cultural baselines. On the other hand, Odom’s (2008)
definitions are very distinct because the IODs and IOIs are polar opposites, as are DHVs and
DLVs. Compliance tests are the fifth wheel with distinct properties from any other interaction
variables. Core signals by definition cannot have overlap just like primary colors cannot overlap
or else they form secondary and different ones. Additionally, core emotional signals are
culturally neutral as it is impossible for a human to mistake a smile for a frown regardless of
culture.

Darwin & Innate Behavior
Charles Darwin attempted to find out why people with no cultural links vented their
emotions in identical ways. He concluded that facial expressions are innate, rather than learned
behavior (Darwin 1872, Wolfgang 1979, Wurzel 1988). Furthermore, Dr. David Matsumoto
tested the idea that expressions are spontaneous and universal based on private reactions of
17

See http://www.affective-sciences.org/webexperimentation for examples of emotion recognition tests.
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Olympic athletes and concluded that his study adds evidence to the theory that people, regardless
of their culture, spontaneously display similar facial expressions (Matsumoto 2009). If nonverbal indicators of emotion are spontaneous and innate then emotions themselves might be
innate. Understanding the five definitions is akin to understanding generally how to use the
operating system Linux and knowing cultural norms and constraints is like knowing how to use
the flavors of Linux: Ubuntu, Fedora, and CentOS, among others. Most of the literature has so
far focused on understanding in detail how to use each flavor or culture whereas more focus
should be on understanding the operating system itself. The study of culture and all underlying
literature is very important to understanding the five basic building blocks of all social
interaction. By no means is non-verbal behavior culturally neutral – far from it. Actually, the
study of cultural baselines is crucial to correctly interpreting signals but a number of gestures are
universal (Wurzel 1988) as are the five aforementioned definitions because they formulate the
underlying program guiding emotion and intuition. For instance, backturning is a universal IOD
for the same reason that eyeclosing and nosewrinkling is a universal reaction to offensive smell
(Wolfgang 1979); it is an attempt to block unpleasant stimuli. Leaders seem to tap primarily into
the universal signals 18 while using cultural norms to amplify their messages.

The Effect of Culture
Culture defends us from the unfamiliar, gives a shared meaning to our interactions
(Wurzel 1988), and creates social constructs that bond with identity. The primary benefit of
distilling all communication into the five basic building blocks is to increase self-awareness
because it enables the individual to better understand the signals given off when communicating.
For example the !Kung people are very reactive to strength. They have a tactic for enforcing
18

See previous definitions of DHV – Demonstration of High Value.
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humility that seems very harsh. They tease and mock the person who contributes great things to
their social circle so that person does not become arrogant and prideful (Wurzel 1988). This is to
prevent the social contributor from putting another down for their own aggrandizement and
demonstrating low value after having “brought home the goods.”
Prisoners in a highly structured and subordinate environment maintain patterns of
behavior consistent with the five building blocks and have their own sort of culture. The cons in
prison act the way they do in order to demonstrate value to one another. The con-screw 19
relationship is an example of one of the most asymmetrical power relationships that scholars
have studied. Cons value one who has a balance of defiance and a little arrogance on one hand,
and composure and intelligence on the other (Wurzel 1988). This is another way of saying they
do not like DLVs. Cons also want to exhibit high value to other cons so they subjugate, often
sexually, young kids or punks (who try to gain reputation by upsetting the social order of the
socialized cons). This is due in part or in whole both to perversion and a scarcity of outlets to
vent frustration stemming from the fact that the con is completely subjugated. Ultimately, each
con tries to alleviate the frustration of having constant subordinate status to the authorities in
whatever way he/she can (Wurzel 1988). While the reason for cons’ incarceration in the first
place is some sort of violation of their nation-state’s larger social order, inmate culture and
communication still resonates with signals containing the same underlying building blocks as the
rest of society. In fact, Lombroso and other scholars of the correctional system called prisons
“schools of evil” where cons pick up skills (Criminal Man 2006). Cons relate their exploits, learn
their own vocabulary, and refine ways of being deadlier predators in this crucible.
Groups often exhibit conflicting and apparently contradictory positions and opinions.
This sets the stage for conflict because of the apparent absence of common ground. These cycles
19

Con = inmate, Screw = correctional officer.
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have a lot of dimensions including identity, power, and group relations (Smith and Berg 1987).
All of this complexity, has one theme in common. This theme is that all paradoxical cycles of
conflict share the same variables: extensive use of the DLV-IOD or IOD-IOD cycle in both
group and dyadic interaction resulting in stagnation. Only a DHV can break those cycles, which
is exactly what a consultant does for a business or group experiencing conflict. The consultant
rids the space of passive-aggressive tensions that continue the aforementioned cycle allowing for
something of a fresh start (Davis 2006).
Establishing a stranger’s baseline, especially for cultural constraints, is the key to
understanding and interpreting behavior. While the emotions may be universal, their display is
sometimes augmented by cultural, sociocultural, psychocultural, and environmental filters
(Gudykunst 1984). For example, while the Japanese may admire the United States’ peer review
system, where younger scholars can critique older scholars’ work to help improve it that system
is unacceptable in Japan. It can be argued that this inability to accept criticism is a weakness.
Some cultures view issues as right/wrong or black/white and has a tendency toward a zero-sum
viewpoint whereas others have tended give partial credit to both or many sides (Nisbett 2003).
Despite the general difference of individual versus collective structure and mental attunement,
the same five definitions apply for all cultures even though expressions of the concepts may vary.

Preventing Conflict
While communicating with others naturally leads to increasing connection and bonding,
it also increases the chances of being involved in a conflict with them (Coser, 1964, Deutsch,
1973).The goal is to work out a unique diagnostic system with which any person regardless of
culture or perspective can correctly read leadership qualities based on the underlying neural
operating system that every human being shares. It is useful to be able to see both verbal and
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nonverbal signals that are harbingers of what is to occur. Certainly some people actually enjoy
destructively handling conflict situations; however, the concepts discussed in this chapter apply
to both constructive and destructive management styles. More importantly, the concepts allow
the scholar to see interactions for what they are: power relationships, and to evaluate interactions
based on sufficiently broad yet distinct and measurable manifestations of verbal and non-verbal
behavior. These definitions represent a first step toward being able to empirically measure the
presence of leadership qualities in each discreet instance of interaction as opposed to either a
present or absent mechanic when analyzing signal patterns.

Congruence Testing Online and Personally
The method of analysis explained in this thesis can be duped because of user error. For
example, if a person consciously understands how to act, he or she could issue a fake DHV as
easily as a fake smile in repeated sequences. It is up to the skill of the receiver to judge the
sincerity of the signal. A great way to do this is to respond to the sender of a signal with an offbalancing remark to illicit a spontaneous response to test for consistency in signals. On the
internet, it is common that entire discussion forums can be derailed with posts from so-called
“trolls” designed to incite anger, frustration, and reactive behavior. Similarly, very social women
utilize a technique called congruence testing, which is designed to drive away men with lower
social status. A woman will give a man adversity to test the man’s reaction to the scenario to see
if he is the real deal. The disarming response usually involves humor and the worst reaction is
falling for the bait and getting angry (Odom 2008). With the emergence of the internet,
congruence testing has taken on a similar strategy in both the personal and commercial sense
thanks to deceptive tactics and spam. Deceptive techniques online can lead to penalties like
blacklisting and bans from search results (Malaga 2008).
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It is important to note that the five definitions have nothing to do with the Profile of
Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS) test despite using descriptors in a similar way. The PONS test
differs because of its use of the categories delve into positive-negative and dominant-submissive
quadrants and it is geared toward the nonverbal (Wolfgang 1979) while the definitions cover
both verbal and nonverbal signals (Odom 2008). Fortunately, the definitions used in this thesis
can be used to evaluate both verbal and nonverbal behavior with the same effectiveness while
avoiding the cultural proximity20 bias. Furthermore, the definitions do not emphasize either the
self as separate from the world or as part of the whole. There is no implicit epistemological
argument with respect to limits 21 (Bennett 1998) and as stated previously the concepts are broad
and distinct enough to apply cross-culturally.

Implimentation of Concepts in Other Fields of Study
There is not really an agreement among scholars on the inclusiveness of the nature of the
field of communication. Each theory has its own methodologies, its own explanatory principles,
and its own lingo (Wolfgang 1979). This is probably one of the best parts about the discipline
because it allows for political scientists, psychologists, and other social scientists to go and tinker
with theories and then inform others of their discoveries. When research is linked across
disciplines, this opens doors for unprecedented perspectives to emerge like the use of physics
models in political science (Litwin 2012). For instance, the concept of administrative access in
computing is adopted by many operating systems and we might call it superuser control, root,
administrator, and so on but as long as the concept is branded, people can identify with it,
understand it better, and expand the idea in the development of future operating systems. In the
20

The cultural proximity hypothesis predicts that samples with great cultural and linguistic proximity to the U.S.
will do better than samples less similar to the U.S (Wolfgang 1979).
21
The definitions do not take sides on whether the world rests on a zero-sum or positive sum paradigm.

36

same way, a brand name needs to be established for communication concepts central to
understanding why the five concepts work alongside facework theory so that validation theory,
face-saving behavior, and the Brown-Levinson theory of politeness all point to the same concept.
The advertising industry studies nonverbal behavior, symbolic linkage, music and
emotional response in order to understand what effect they have on brand attitudes and buying
behavior. Most of the methods used involve trial and error until something is found that works
effectively and most of them share the notion that there must be consistency between the visual
stimulus, music and affect from the nonverbal component (Hecker 1988). For example, if one is
trying to sell a bleeding edge electronic device or sports car then having Robert Downey Jr.
talking about it to rock and roll with his Iron Man pose would be a consistent message. Having
him sell farming equipment in that context is probably inconsistent; however, stranger pairings in
advertising have existed. 22 Marketers love to use the concept of pre-selection to create the
“everyone is buying this” effect, by which others reason that the product is good if it is being
sold out at such a high rate. 23 This can be done with industry leaders or celebrities that have
credibility in the given industry. Pre-selection touches social conformity, which is such an
incredibly strong social instinct that it was one of the key experiences in Nazi schools: strength
through discipline, community, and action (Wurzel 1988).

Tempo and Baselines
Baselining norms of personal space and rate of movement is fairly simple although
cataloguing these is not useful because norms can vary by subculture. For instance, Asians and
Native Americans often interpret European/American gesturing as intrusive and aggressive
22

Surreal effects are used in marketing to great effect. See GEICO commercials, Vikings/barbarians in Capital One
commercials, etc.
23
For example, “That’s why everyone is switching to MetroPCS.”
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(Bennett 1998). This is an example where baselines matter. A typical Italian or Greek may be
characterized as vivace 24 but when we examine leaders and public figures across cultures we
often do not notice that they tend to talk and gesture more slowly and take up more personal
space for what is normal in their respective culture. Leaders have a walking speed to their
actions. Musically this is adagio 25, but walking speed has a continuum. Adagio is not a strict
number of beats per minute (bpm). For one culture that interpretation may be 55 bpm and for
another than might be as high as 68 bpm. Individual interpreters may vary the tempo at times, at
their discretion as both readers and the executors of the action. However, all cultures can agree
that presto agitato 26 is not adagio. Just like in music, there is some room for the artist’s
interpretation of human signals (both verbal and nonverbal). This is why determining a person’s
baseline in context of both culture and personality is crucial to reading his or her signals
correctly. Within cultures there are gendered differences in expected behavior and interpretation
of that behavior. For example, women in Vietnam tend to express their emotions in more
subdued ways than do women from the United States because it is expected behavior. It would
be very rare for example for an Vietnamese woman to meet and hold a man’s gaze but an
American woman is likely to do that and more if she is interested (Litwin 2013).

Summary
It is useful to go over the five interaction variables again because they will be used to test
all of the interactions in Chapter Four. In summary, the manifestation of DHV signals from an
elite helps to solidify his or her position. The manifestation of DLV signals from a follower
concurrently with the elite’s emission of DHV signals helps to bolster the elite’s position.
24

Rhythm that is lively, or animated.
Rhythm at a walking pace, stately.
26
Rhythm that is very quick and shows excitement or even anger.
25

38

However, when the elite manifests DLV signals he or she undermines his or her position. Below
are the definitions of the five variables again in a more condensed form factor. This works across
cultural boundaries.
Indicator of Interest (IOI): This is any indicator of a willingness to engage or sustain in
a passive-positive to active-positive interaction with a person or an indicator of wanting
to get approval from another person. An IOI can indicate compliance, attraction, valuing
another person more than one’s self in sexual applications, and valuing another person at
least equal in all other applications.
Indicator of Disinterest (IOD): Any indicator that leads to a break in rapport,
disacknowledgment, avoidance, impatience, fear, belligerence, or resistance.
Demonstration of High Value (DHV): A demonstration, indirectly through narrative and
consistent non-verbal behavior, of indicators that convey social value. Examples include
wealth, pre-selection, peer validation, healthy emotional wiring, followers jump through
leader’s conversational hoops without undue effort, attention-seeking behavior, or
outcome dependency.
Demonstration of Low Value (DLV): This is a demonstration of eagerness to the point
of neediness, outcome dependency, in some cases unnecessary submissiveness, or a
vitriolic, hair trigger reactivity to events that do not warrant such a response
Compliance Test: A conversational or non-verbal hoop through which the speaker may
compel the listener to jump in order to test for whether rapport or trust has been built with
the listener.
Keeping the aforementioned signals in mind within cultural norms of those leaders under
scrutiny is crucial to properly baselining and measuring political leaders’ responses. Watching for
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these universal signals sometimes with multiple passes (if video is recorded) can be the key to
revealing political leaders’ masked emotions and tells. The next chapter reveals how to
systematize the process to some extent on paper allowing for multiple individuals to go over
transcripts and videos of political leaders in action.
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CHAPTER THREE: CODING RULES, METHODOLOGY, &
UNCOVERING OF INTERACTION PATTERNS
Appendices A, B, and C are simply transcripts of negotiations by state representatives
and where the interactions are coded based on the definitions: IOD, IOI, DHV, DLV, and CT. In
Chapter Four, patterns (if any) of interaction are discussed in cases of conflict and contrast those
to patterns found in situations of accord. These transcripts are analyzed in chapter five and
compared with expectations where the concepts explain in Chapter Two will be explained in
action. The transcripts were selected because they illustrated the frameworks of analysis of
interaction in a clear and reasonably concise manner for a thesis. The transcripts depicted
instances of two leaders interacting (Malta Summit), elites performing in a debate (Bush,
Clinton, and Perot in the 1992 Presidential debate), a conflictual interaction that was respolved
(Newt Gingrich in the 2012 South Carolina Presidential Primary Debate) and the accompanying
frameworks in terms of the variables used to code the communication. The transcript only
material is of the Malta Summit between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W.
Bush and their colleagues. The second video and video transcripts are of the interactions of
participants in the Presidential Debate in Richmond between Ross Perot, George H.W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. The second video and video transcripts are of the interactions of participants in the
South Carolina Primary of 2012 between Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, and Ron
Paul.

Transcript Formatting Procedures
1. The paragraph breaks are added for flow and do not follow the way the speakers
necessarily spoke during the audio or video recording. This is particularly true for the
Malta Summit Transcript, which was translated from Russian by Vladislav Zubok and
41

Svetlana Savranskaya. The source are as follows:
a. Zubok, V., & Savranskaya S (Trans)., (1989). Soviet Transcript of the Malta
Summit. Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf
b. Presidential debate in Richmond, Virginia. (1992). George Bush Presidential
Library and Museum. Retrieved from
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=4959&year=1992&mo
nth=all
c. Sweet, L., (2012). South Carolina GOP CNN debate. Retrieved from
http://2012election.procon.org/sourcefiles/Jan_19_2012_republican_debate.pdf
2. Any time a new participant joins the discussion or an existing participant interrupts then
the partial sentence will be placed on its own line.
3. If the participants talk over each other, the transcript treats it as if they were talking
individually one after the other and follows rule two.
4. No line numbers are used.
5. The interaction variable, especially for verbal communication, coded is always first
before the name of the participant.
6. Explanations of nonverbal behavior are placed as closely to their verbal counterparts as
possible without disrupting the flow of the verbal part of the transcript.
7. Interaction variables coded and any explanations interspersed throughout the transcript
material are always in bold and underlined lettering to make it easy for the reader to
separate from the transcribed text.
8. Laughter is included in the transcriptions but “umms’ and ahhs” are omitted. “Ahs” and
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“umms” are only important when the speaker uses them to convey defensive behavior.
The baseline for all the cases was that there was no excessive use by any participant.
9. Italics were used to highlight parts of the interaction that were of key importance to
coding the interaction and are not indicative of emphasis. Italics are not always used,
especially in transcripts where video is available.
10. No obvious sounding tones were included in the transcripts because either they were not
available (as in the Malta Summit Transcript) or not needed as video is available (in the
other two transcripts).
a. The different formats affect the coding in the following ways: where no video
exists, only the verbal signals are interpreted so there are ought to be fewer
signals that can be interpreted for every given exchange. That is why the
transcript for the Malta Summit case is so much longer than the other two cases.
More verbal signals are required to compensate for lack of nonverbal ones.
b. Nonverbal signals allow for greater accuracy. In general, when video and audio of
an interaction between two discussants is not available, the accuracy of who wins
the interaction is negatively affected.
11. When multiple definitions are necessary to code a given set of speech, such as an
indicator of interest followed by a compliance test, it is coded as such at the beginning of
the interaction, next to the name of the discussant without interruptions in the text of the
transcript.
12. Where there is a discrepancy between verbal and nonverbal behavior both are coded. For
example verbal IOD and nonverbal DHV the signal code is IOD, DHV. The reader should
be mindful that the nonverbal signal carries more credibility (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey,
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2006). However, no distinction is made in the code in any of the chapters or Appendix D,
for the distinction, the reader should refer to the transcripts in Appendices A, B, and C for
the distinction and play-by-play explanation.
13. Any time that the discussants made grammatical mistakes, every effort is made to
preserve exactly what was stated minus “ahs” and “umms” except in the Malta Summit
case where the translation was performed by an outside party.

Decision Rules for Coding Variables
1. The variables IOD, IOI, DHV, DLV, and Compliance Test (CT) are used in line with the
aforementioned definitions as manifestations of behavior. Sometimes the terms reframing
and compliance are used to more accurately describe the interaction but these are still the
same thing as DHV and IOI variables respectively.
2. Not Applicable or N/A is used when the contribution of the discussant is merely to move
the conversation along and does not constitute a compliance test. For example, the phrase
“We have a question right here.” although implying cooperation from the discussants,
does not ask them for it explicitly and does not offer the option of an IOD. Another
example is when one discussant asks another to repeat something he or she did not hear.
When there is no cost to comply, or clarify something the interaction is coded as N/A. If a
violation occurs when there is no cost to compliance, then it can be coded as an automatic
DLV because it is overrating to the situation. The discussant could interrupt but would be
seen as a social violator. In contrast when the moderator says something like “I want to
ask everyone to get comfortable and take their seats while I tell you about the proper
protocols. I will guide the discussion…You will have two minutes to respond to questions
and 45 seconds for follow-ups and rebuttals.” These rules are flexible and compliance can
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largely be avoided if circumstances and framing allows for it. The discussant could go
over the time allotted and get away with it without anyone noticing. Since there is the
option of complying or not complying with the request, the coding CT is used.
3. Both footnotes and in-text bold and underlined comments on behavior are made in the
appendices where needed. Both are used in order to get around spacing constraints where
needed or useful. One is not more or less meaningful than the other.
4. The decision-making process behind assigning codes is as follows: Three individuals
who understand the definitions coded the transcripts in the appendices separately. Then
the codes were compared side-by-side. When the codes were not unanimous, that
segment of the transcript was marked for review. The coding team then discussed the
differences and came to consensus. After discussion, the team came to unanimous
agreement on the interaction variables in the appendices.
5. When coding, this is the logic behind the decision-making process used
i. The coding team must consist of an odd number of members in order to prevent a
deadlock.
ii. If the dissenting party is able to prove his or her case and get the others to retract
their codes and align with the dissenting party’s then after discussion, that code is
used.
iii. If there is persisting dissent after discussion and the dissenting party fails to
demonstrate the validity of his or her opinion, then majority vote wins.
iv. Dissent usually indicates an incorrect understanding of the definitions used to
code the variables so great care should be exercised in discussing and figuring out
who made an error in coding.
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v. Hyphens are used “---------------------” to indicate another plenary session during
the Malta Summit. See the corresponding section in Appendix A to see specifics.

Accounting for Deception
Despite the procedures employed to make sure that the test can be duplicated with
reasonable accuracy and transplanted to other case studies, one could make the charge that public
communications like those in the transcripts are just window-dressing. They do not accurately
reflect people’s real beliefs and therefore are not meaningful data to analyze. Political speeches
are designed to appeal to an audience and may not really represent a politician’s real feelings and
intentions. This is valid if the politician is already perfect at controlling the signals he or she
gives off, particularly nonverbal signals. Certainly, those who have consciously mastered control
of involuntary impulses may have an advantage. There is no way to find out who is lying except
by testing their resolve. It is like saying because someone is a good liar, one should not attempt
to find where the lie is and should ignore their public remarks. The congruence testing system
used to detect lies is as close to foolproof as possible, over repeated interaction, the lie will be
found because of the “leakage” of incongruent emotional signals. Certainly, it is possible to
deceive an audience whether audience is the courtroom, the polygraph expert, or the national
spectators, but congruence testing is the ultimate disciplinarian and absolutely relentless. A
façade can often be difficult to keep up under intense pressure from a skeptical audience. This is
why, for example, a politician can surge in popularity in a primary but then quickly lose steam
later on in the election – a deficiency of congruent signals over a longer interaction period. Is it a
surprise then that as campaign seasons have gotten longer, even perpetual, that public trust in
government has declined? Certainly there are other reasons, like constant live media coverage
and interference in frame control from opinion leaders.
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The three case studies were evaluated by measuring frequency and patterns of occurrence
of the five interaction constructs defined in Chapter Two: IOI, IOD, DLV, DHV, and CT. The
cases were chosen because they display a diverse set of signal variations during different types of
interactions. Despite having small numbers of signals for the last two case studies, we have the
ability to evaluate the candidates’ nonverbal signals. These interaction constructs comprise the
independent variables while the patterns formed by the combination of these patterns comprise
the dependent variable. A simple frequency distribution of the different signals during a given
interaction is used to display the findings and to compare patterns with the other case studies.
The cases where nonverbal signals are available do not need to be as long because nonverbal
behavior comprises as much as 93 percent of all communication (Borg 2010). This is the
equivalent of saying that nonverbal signals matter about 14 times more than verbal ones.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DIAGRAMS & EXPLANATIONS
The flowcharts in Chapter One represented my expectations for how interactions might
happen. While they may have merit in other applications like modeling ideal interactions, elite
actors showed that they act in slightly different, although still measurable, and often predictable
ways. Most notably, this is observable in the way elites handle control the frame of reference for
the duration of the interaction. In other words, elites prefer to control what direction the
conversation is headed and constantly compliance test those with whom they interact. Instead of
jumping through even fellow elites’ conversational hoops, an elite may jump through one and
immediately compliance test for reciprocated good behavior. Elites compliance test in a very titfor-tat manner, but do not react in a tit-for-tat manner, which tends to be better diagramed in
tables or graphs as opposed to flowcharts, especially for any long interactions. The flowcharts
end up being too long and confusing as opposed to cyclical like in Figure 2. For the most part,
flowcharts are useful to illustrate idealized interactions, but not for analyzing events as they
happened.

Malta Summit Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables
The Malta Summit was a meeting between the U.S. and Soviet delegations aboard the
Soviet ship SS Maxim Gorkij. The location was mostly symbolic of the better relations between
the two superpowers. The meeting was a continuation from the Reagan-Gorbachev talks where
the European allies of the United States urged the U.S. into these bilateral talks. The two leaders
discussed reforms the transformation of relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The
meetings themselves were private but news conferences were held after the exchanges. The full
contents of this meeting are available in Appendix A. The coded signals are only for verbal
signals as visual data is absent for this case study.
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The following table shows the final coding protocol and Appendix D shows the full
reliability testing procedures. Separating the interaction variables from the transcripts allows the
researcher to more easily see patterns. The table should be read vertically left to right, resetting
on each page in the top left corner.
Table 1: Appendix A Final Signal Codes
Side
Discussant
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
----------------------- ----------------------Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev
United States
Bush
Soviet
Gorbachev

Signal
IOI
IOI
IOI
IOI
IOI
IOI, CT
IOI
CT
IOI/IOD, UNCLEAR
DLV, CT
IOD
CT
IOI, DHV, CT
IOI
IOI, CT
IOI
IOI, CT
IOI
IOI
--------------------------------DHV, CT
IOI
CT
DHV
CT
IOD
IOD
DHV, CT
IOI
CT
IOD
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Side
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet

Discussant
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev

Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
----------------------Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States

Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
----------------------Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush

Signal
N/A
N/A
IOD
IOD
CT
IOI, DHV, CT
IOI
CT
IOI
IOI
IOI, CT
IOI PARTIAL, IOD
PARTIAL
CT
IOD
IOD, CT
IOI
IOI
DHV
IOI, DHV
IOI
IOI
CT
IOD
DHV, CT
IOI
--------------------------------IOI, CT
IOI, DHV
IOI, CT
IOI
IOI
IOI
CT
IOI, INTERRUPT
CT
IOI
IOI
IOI
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Side
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
Soviet
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
Soviet
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States

Discussant
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Shevardnadze
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Baker
Gorbachev
Bush
Baker
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Yakovlev
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Baker
Gorbachev
Baker
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Bush
Shevardnadze
Scowcroft

Signal
IOI, CT
IOD
IOD
DHV
IOI, CT
IOI
IOI
DHV
CT
IOI
IOI
CT
IOI
IOI
CT
IOD
CT
DHV
CT
IOD
IOD TO BAKER
IOI TO GORBACHEV
ATTEMPTED DHV
IOD TO BAKER
DHV, CT
IOD
IOD, DHV
IOD TO BUSH/BAKER
CT
IOI
DLV
IOD TO BAKER
CT
STRONG IOD TO BAKER
CT
IOI, CT
IOD
IOD TO BUSH
DHV
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Side
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
United States
Soviet
Soviet
United States
United States
Soviet
United States

Discussant
Gorbachev
Bush
Gorbachev
Baker
Gorbachev
Baker
Shevardnadze
Gorbachev
Bush
Baker
Gorbachev
Baker

Signal
CT
IOI
IOI
DHV, CT
IOI
CT
IOD TO BAKER
IOI TO SHEVARDNADZE
IOI TO SHEVARDNADZE
IOD
IOD TO BAKER
IOD TO SHEVARDNADZE

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes Malta Summit
DHV
DLV
IOI
IOD
CT
Frequency of Signal
17
2
55
28
39
Percentage of Total
(given signal/total of
all signals)
12%
1%
39%
20%
28%
Soviet Signals
6
0
31
19
22
Soviet Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal type)
United States
Signals
United States
Percentage of Signal
(signal type for
side/total of signal
type)

35%

0%

56%

68%

56%

11

2

24

9

17

65%

100%

44%

32%

44%

A quick glance at the above Table 2, which pools basic signal data from the above Table
1, reveals that there is a high frequency of IOIs, especially at the beginning of the interaction.
Since IOI is the most frequent signal or mode and the conversation begins with IOIs, this
indicates that a high frequency of IOIs is part of the baseline of the interaction. Therefore, an IOI
is not as meaningful because the two parties are artificially trying to be nice to one another in
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order to build rapport either because of decorum or other reasons. We know this is the case
because of the historical context in which this meeting was undertaken – the European allies
pushed the U.S. and USSR to meet while Bush was initially not as warm with Gorbachev as
Reagan had been. Additionally, it is artificial because the leaders of two superpowers locked in a
Cold War for the past fifty years or so are likely to have choice words for one another. Instead
they are sending each other multiple non-threatening signals in an attempt to tread on new
ground as the verbal discourse confirms. The two sides send primarily compliance test, IOI, and
IOD signals. DHV is largely used for reframing in this particular set of interactions. Recall, the
subtext of the Bush-Gorbachev dialogue was the relatively cold relationship between the two
men based on Bush’s feeling that Gorbachev might not be the ‘the real deal’. James Baker and
George H.W. Bush were foreign policy realists who instinctively distrusted Gorbachev as a
reformer and both attended the Summit. The high level of IOIs from both leaders is indicative of
the fact that Gorbachev and Bush are trying to qualify each other and make sure that both retain
face value as equals in the eyes of the public they are accountable to. Much of the time the
variables also mirror each other, which is indicative of rapport building.
While the two men are obviously trying to cooperate, there is an underlying tension in the
room revealed when Baker finally IODs Gorbachev. This mirrors framework six because this
change of frequency and type of interaction variables reveals a difference of feelings. Then there
is a cascade of IODs from both sides where it almost begins to resemble a classic case of good
cop bad cop where Bush is the good cop trying to get concessions out of the Soviets by prying
the bad cop Baker off Gorbachev. However, the data is incomplete because nonverbal interaction
is missing from the analysis of the variables. To confirm the accuracy of the assigned variables to
each exchange, the nonverbal language of the discussants would have to be congruence-tested
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against their verbal statements. For example, if Baker was saying tough things to Gorbachev but
then acting defensively for his cultural and personal norms, then he does not believe what he is
saying and is therefore pliable. Secondarily, the nonverbal reactions of the discussants to IODs
from their counterparts would indicate who was wielding more power. This loosely follows
framework 2. When a verbal IOD is answered with a verbal IOD the offended is likely to signal
repeated IODs or DLVs. If the offender receives IODs in verbal channels then the offended
perceives his/her position as one of strength relative to the offender. If the offender receives
DLVs verbally then the offended perceives his/her position as one of weakness relative to the
offender.

Richmond, VA Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables
The Richmond, VA 1992 Presidential Debate was a debate between the Republican
President George H.W. Bush and the two challengers Independent Ross Perot and Democrat Bill
Clinton. This was a public, televised debate with input from the moderator and the audience. The
issue at hand in this subsection was the state of economy and its impact on wealthier individuals.
The full contents of this debate with elaborations on each signal are available in Appendix B. The
coded signals are for both verbal and nonverbal communication. Since the participants’ verbal
and nonverbal signals were congruent it was more efficient to code any given signal only once
instead of coding one part verbal signal and thirteen parts of repeated nonverbal signals. Verbal
and nonverbal congruence also enables us to experiment with much shorter segments of
interactions to gauge who displayed leadership qualities based on their emissions of DHV or
DLV signals although for large N studies it is probably best to sequence out the entire debate.
The following table shows the final coding protocol and Appendix D shows the full reliability
testing procedures.
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Table 3: Appendix B Final Signal Codes
Discussant
Signal
Ms. Simpson
N/A
(moderator)
Audience Participant IOD, CT
Perot
IOI, DLV
Ms. Simpson
N/A
Perot
DLV
Audience Participant CT
Perot
DLV
Ms. Simpson
N/A
Bush
DHV
Ms. Simpson
IOD, INTERRUPT
Audience Participant IOD, INTERRUPT
Ms. Simpson
IOD, INTERRUPT
Bush
DLV
Audience Participant IOD, INTERRUPT
Bush
DLV
Audience Participant N/A
Bush
CT
Audience Participant IOD
Bush
DLV, INTERRUPT
Audience Participant IOD, CT
Ms. Simpson
N/A
Bush
DLV
Clinton
CT, DHV
Audience Participant IOI
Clinton
DHV
Table 3 represents a distilled model of interaction where both verbal and nonverbal signal
channels are examined. There is a high level of congruence between verbal and nonverbal signals
(see Appendix B for play-by-play details). In contrast to Bush’s relative comfort when he was
talking to Gorbachev during the Malta Summit, Table 3 shows Bush acting defensively with
repeated DLVs on both verbal and nonverbal channels after receiving numerous IODs from the
Audience Participant and Moderator. When Bush tries to reframe out of the Audience
Participant’s frame he gets interrupted and IODed verbally three times. Unsure of how to
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proceed, Bush’s eye contact becomes random, he looks at his watch, and looks away from the
Audience Participant instead of approaching her and trying to build rapport. This unstructured
interaction is in direct contrast to the structured interaction with Gorbachev where face-saving
mechanisms that were evident during the Malta Summit as well as aides. During that exchange
both Bush and Gorbachev allowed the other to compliance test or reframe out of an
uncomfortable situation. This is probably because neither man expected hostility from the other
side as evidenced by the abundance of IOI signals. There was clear signaling that common
ground was being sought by both sides despite disagreements in how to carry out certain policy
objectives. Personality might have something to do with it, but the goals of Gorbachev at the
Malta Summit and the Audience Participant in the Presidential Debate were very different.
Table 3 illustrates a case when one side of an issue does not understand the problem or
issue the other side has. Instead of showing dominance, leadership, and powering through, Bush
fumbles the interaction. He shows a loss of face value and control of the interaction by falling
into the Audience Participant’s frame. A much more aggressive candidate might IOD the
Audience Participant forcibly by saying something like “Hold on, let me finish!” after being
interrupted, proceed in his current frame, and then DHV by saying something like “A cancer
survivor is not the only person that is qualified to perform surgery on a cancer patient. What
you’re suggesting is a false disqualifier and would disqualify all presidential candidates because
none of us struggles with debt. However, it does not mean we do not understand economic
problems or how to fix them. On the contrary, people successful at dealing with problems and
even prospering during tough times are those whom you would prefer at the helm.” That
statement gags the dissent and then demonstrates value by disrupting the frame and
reconstructing it to one’s own advantage while not aggrandizing one’s self. It may lose one vote,
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but is very persuasive to the group because this frame commands authority and obedience when
the nonverbal language is also dominant, and open. It satisfies both the rational, and emotional
switches in the public consciousness. Regardless of how a candidate accomplishes this, the DHV
is essential to success, especially when it contrasts against an opponent’s DLV. Clinton chooses a
less aggressive route, but still uses the mandatory DHV module with his congruent, suave
nonverbal behavior and verbal empathy with the Audience Participant’s problem. How do we
know that Clinton won the audience member over? In the course of DHV signaling he
compliance tested her to see if she was with him and replied with an IOI signal. Clinton came off
as collected and although he sent just two DHV signals on paper, his congruent nonverbal DHVs,
Bush’s reactive facial expressions, and the Bush and Perot’s contrasting DLV signals bolstered
Clinton’s position in the debate. Instead of knocking the Audience Participant into his frame
forcibly, Clinton draws her in willingly. Clinton explains how he dealt with problems like hers
routinely and implies that her vote for him would be a vote for improvement.
Table 4: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes Richmond, VA
DHV
DLV
IOI
IOD
CT
Bush Signals
1
4
0
1
1
Bush Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Perot Signals

33%
0

57%
3

0%
1

13%
0

20%
0

Perot Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Clinton Signals

0%
2

43%
0

50%
0

0%
0

0%
1

67%

0%

0%

0%

20%

0

0

1

7

3

Clinton Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
AP + Moderator
Signals
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DHV
AP + Moderator
Percentage of Signal
(signal type for
side/total of signal
types)
Total
Percentage of Total
(given signal/total of
all signals)

DLV

IOI

IOD

CT

0%
3

0%
7

50%
2

88%
8

60%
5

12%

28%

8%

32%

20%

Table 4 provides a visually functional way to examine interaction variables broken down
by participant. This table includes verbal and nonverbal signals but does not double code for both
when the verbal and nonverbal signals are congruent. The mode or baseline for this part of the
debate is the IOD signal. The audience participant makes it clear she is unhappy with the
economy. The differences are stark when comparing the signals of Perot and Bush versus those
of Clinton. The substantial manifestation of DLV signals hampers their ability to connect with
the Audience Participant and the viewing audience as a whole. Clinton’s response is very discreet
but it is all that is necessary when contrasting against such an abundance of DLV signaling.

South Carolina Primary Pattern Recognition Amid Interaction Variables
The South Carolina Presidential Primary was a debate between the Republican candidates
Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, and Ron Paul in 2012. This was a public,
televised debate with input from the moderator. The full contents of this debate with elaborations
on each signal are available in Appendix C. The coded signals are for both verbal and nonverbal
communication. Since the participants’ verbal and nonverbal signals were congruent as in case
two, it was more efficient to code any given signal only once instead of coding one part verbal
signal and thirteen parts of repeated nonverbal signals. Some candidates displayed what looks
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like an N of 1so their display of leadership qualities based on their emissions of DHV or DLV
signals cannot be assessed. Only Newt Gingrich manifests enough signals to make an assessment
about his ability to displayed leadership qualities. Ron Paul almost self-destructs from the
beginning by opening with DLV signal but the other two candidates’ positions are untouched.
Again, to determine the actual winner of the debate, a large N sequenced out is preferable. The
following table shows the final coding protocol and Appendix D shows the full reliability testing
procedures.
Table 5: Appendix C Final Signal Codes
Discussant
Signal
King (moderator)
CT
Santorum
IOI
King
N/A
Romney
IOI
King
N/A
Gingrich
IOI
King
N/A
Ron Paul
DLV
King
CT
Gingrich
IOD, DHV
King
CT
Gingrich
IOD
King
DLV
Gingrich
DHV, IOD
King
DLV
Gingrich
IOD
King
DLV
Gingrich
IOD, DHV

Table 5 illustrates yet another distilled set of interaction where both verbal and nonverbal
signal channels are examined. There is a very high level of congruence between verbal and
nonverbal signals (see Appendix C for play-by-play details). Table 5 shows an interaction where
Newt Gingrich is tearing into the moderator, so much that there is spontaneous booing from the
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audience against the moderator. Although Gingrich’s performance has no impact on the other
candidates’ performance, Gingrich’s own signaling seems to put him ahead of the pack from the
onset. From Gingrich’s framing of himself and Romney as the serious candidates, Romney
comes out second. Santorum is third because Ron Paul opened with a DLV signal. All of this
happened before the actual debate between the candidates even began. The situation here was
such that the moderator attempted to unbalance Newt Gingrich with a controversial question
right from the start and instead of seeing unprepared defensiveness, the moderator got lambasted
so effortlessly and methodically by Gingrich that he was forced to back down. There was
seemingly no defense and Gingrich’s advance seemed extraordinary, especially in contrast to the
wilting moderator. Instead of taking the loss, and backing down, the moderator then chose to
blame others for the indiscretion which resulted in the receipt of a flurry of verbal censure from
both Gingrich and more spontaneous booing from the audience. This is one of the clearest cases
of how a decisive resolution in a verbal dispute looks like when diagramed with interaction
signals. A classic alpha-beta pattern is the when the alpha repeatedly IOD, DHV, and CT signals
while the beta DLV signals until the interaction is terminated. By DLV signaling the beta
reaffirms the alpha’s position who is signaling all around that he or she is not to be challenged
again – this yields a clear resolution in conflict. One participant consistently manifests high value
(DHV) and disinterest (IOD) signals and the other consistently manifests DLV signals. In this
instance of decisive conflict interaction there is no quarter given. Instead of the interaction
explained in Figure 1 there where cyclical parity of ever dropping face value is the norm, the
opposite situation is demonstrated by Table 5. At the cost of King’s social value, Gingrich’s
position is strengthened for proving he can defend himself chiefly because Gingrich avoided
damaging frames of reference without being reactive or defensive. Gingrich shows a “best-case”
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of how to succinctly showcase leadership behavior.
On a secondary note, it is important to contrast Ron Paul’s introduction with those of the
other Republican candidates. While Rick Santorum, Mitt Romney, and Newt Gingrich offered
pleasant, generic greetings (without undue effort, identifying with the constituents of a Southern
state (IOI signals), Ron Paul went out of his way to tell the audience about how he was in some
way more qualified as an OB-GYN and veteran appearing somewhat nervous in the process. This
kind of DLV signaling is very repulsive (Odom 2008). This try-hard, bumbling approach lacks
all superhuman or divine essence.

Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Final Signal Codes South Carolina
DHV
DLV
IOI
IOD
CT
Gingrich Signals
3
0
1
5
0
Gingrich Percentage
of Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Santorum Signals

100%
0

0%
0

33%
1

100%
0

0%
0

Santorum Percentage
of Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Romney Signals

0%
0

0%
0

33%
1

0%
0

0%
0

Romney Percentage
of Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Paul Signals

0%
0

0%
1

33%
0

0%
0

0%
0

Paul Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
King Signals

0%
0

25%
3

0%
0

0%
0

0%
3
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DHV
King Percentage of
Signal (signal type
for side/total of
signal types)
Total
Percentage of Total

0%
3
17%

DLV

75%
4
22%

IOI

0%
3
16%

IOD

0%
5
28%

CT

100%
3
17%

Table 6 shows again the usefulness of examining interaction variables broken down by
participant. It is important to remember that this is just the beginning of the debate and the entire
debate was not part of this study. However, this chart demonstrates the differences in how the
candidates started out. This table includes verbal and nonverbal signals but does not double code
for both when the verbal and nonverbal signals are congruent as they were congruent for every
single candidate. The mode or baseline for this part of the interaction is IOD. Just like in Table 4,
those candidates manifesting the DLV signal are seen as weaker than their peers although this is
assessed after the fact during exit polls. Further testing should be done with more than three case
studies where DLV signals are present to determine if the effect on the discussants and the public
is always so palpable. If this is true, then self-control and level-headed replies to difficult
questions in the light of public scrutiny are good predictors of who will acquire leadership
positions, although probabilistic. The situation involving Newt Gingrich suggests that the
validity of the scandal itself does not matter – only the responses can convey value or lack
thereof. A counter argument here might be that debates do not contribute significantly to
changing voters’ minds about who is most qualified to lead the country. When Richard Nixon
debated John F. Kennedy, on television those who saw both believed Kennedy won while those
who only heard both, believed that Nixon won (Webley 2010). Nonverbal behavior and
appearance can have a significant impact on public opinion and even if it only tilts public
opinion by two or three percentage points thanks to congruently manifesting the DHV signals,
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that is easily enough to turn elections in a different direction.

Summary
DHV and DLV signals are weighed more heavily than all the others, helping the one who
manifests them gain or lose social value at the fastest rate but they are also the rarest over long
term interactions (Odom 2008). Note how all the interactions scrutinized in this thesis have used
IOI or IOD signals as modes over the whole of the interaction even if individual actors deviated
from this.
Observe how the charts are all completely different depending on the interaction type
(e.g. hostile, cooperative, competitive). For instance, in a negotiation like the Malta Summit
there was such a high number of IOI, CT, and IOD signals. This is because these kinds of signals
fit the goal of the interaction. One can have a perfectly good, friendly, non-conflictual interaction
with the mode consisting of IOD signals but this is not as useful in a negotiation where the goal
is consensus building. If Bush had tried to IOD and DHV signal the entire time, the results might
be destabilizing instead of consensus building. Gorbachev did everything to keep the Soviet
Union and United States on equal footing. If the meeting were with a two-bit dictator from the
Southern Hemisphere then equal footing is not what the United States or Soviet Union might
want the opposing side to feel. The mode signal might be an IOD, but there would still be a
plethora of compliance tests and DHV signals.
In another case, like the Bush-Perot-Clinton debate, the mode was a series of IOD signals
from the Audience Participant. This makes sense considering she was quite upset about the
economic situation. Clinton’s pithy response rested on the magnitude of his scarce DHV signals
where he did not open himself up to being disqualified or criticized. Bush had already done the
work of disqualifying himself so why rehash that? There is no reason to prove once again what
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has already been proven and little effort was required on his part so again the signals make sense.
In the South Carolina Republican Debate there was every reason for Gingrich to contrast himself
with the moderator, destroy the moderator’s credibility and raise his own value. While Gingrich’s
bar graph looks nothing like Bill Clinton’s, Gingrich was still able to convey social value.
Clinton’s method raises value without costing an opponent any while the other method raises
social standing at the cost of the offender’s. There is not a single pattern that defines success. If
that were the case then liars would simply learn to copy it and never lose. Certainly one
candidate can fake DHV signals for a time but then he or she looks exponentially worse if and
when a DLV signal is discovered. The cost of a flurry of DLV signals is astronomical to a public
figure by comparison to the blunder of an unknown candidate. The unknown candidate can fade
back into obscurity with little further scrutiny. Again, the successful interactions all have a
congruent DHV signal but it is up to the individual to determine how the situation warrants the
other signals to be broadcast. The presence of DHV and absence of DLV signals is the hallmark
of success. However, there is no set rule for how, if, and when to manifest IOI, IOD, and CT
signals – this depends on the goal of the communicator and the environmental constraints. An
elite can ascertain “success” only when by comparison to those around, that elite is the best at
congruent signaling backed up by action when the congruent signaling is tested.

Practical Applications & Discussion
It has been discussed at length that the DLV signal is poisonous and drives a wedge
between the one who manifests it and success. In the beginning of the thesis the concept of
constant vigilance was discussed. Keeping one’s emotions and anger in check applies to the
common man and the elite. Anger and vitriol are both DLV signals because the reaction seems
out of proportion to what caused it. Although some people may be cowed by tantrums, over the
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long term the result is a loss of respect. In 1809 Napoleon, angry and distressed, rushed back
from his Spanish wars to Paris after his intelligence services conflict that two of his ministers had
conspired against him. Upon his arrival, Napoleon summoned the ministers into his palace
immediately, and began to pace up and down the room, blathering indistinctly about plots against
him. The minister most responsible for Napoleon’s fury, foreign minister Talleyrand, leaned
back, looking calm and entirely apathetic. Napoleon tried to agitate Talleyrand by accusing him
of treason expecting fear and groveling. Instead the minister looked on calmly with a smirk. This
apparent insubordination pushed Napoleon over the edge. He raged at Talleyrand, screaming at
him, spewing profanity, and calling him number of things including coward, brazen, and holding
nothing sacrosanct (implying loyalty). The ministers looked upon Napoleon with disbelief
because he had overreacted so egregiously and Talleyrand continued to stare back at him unfazed
(Greene 1998). At the end of his tirade, Napoleon lost an enormous amount of face value and
looked quite ridiculous with his face red, eyes bulging, and heavy breathing. After Napoleon was
done with his tantrum, he fired Talleyrand but did not have him hanged. Talleyrand did not have
to defend himself. His body language and composure manifested the DHV signal for him. After
this indiscretion, rumor spread that Napoleon’s power was declining (Greene 1998).
As for the conspiracy, Talleyrand rumor has it that he actually planned to overthrow or
physically harm Napoleon but he knew of his master’s temper and wanted that quality brought
out in the open so that public opinion would eventually hang Napoleon. The reasoning behind
this is that the ministers in question could have evaded Napoleon’s detection and plotted more
thoroughly. They were likely baiting Napoleon into throwing a tantrum for all to see.
Immediately after his tantrum, Napoleon’s public opinion “score” sank (Greene 1998). To show
frustration is to show one has lost power to shape affairs. Once frustration is detected, it neither
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coerces nor inspires loyalty because it is an emotion born of desperation and exasperation. Both
represent a conspicuous DLV, accentuated by previously having a myth of infallibility that
Napoleon had.
The solution to controlling one’s anger, counter-intuitively is not repression, however.
The answer lies again in the concepts of social value conveyed in the interaction variables.
Nothing should be taken personally when it comes to the acquisition of power because invariably
as one person hoists himself or herself up he or she might bump into others. The key to dealing
with anger lies in the IOD and DHV signals. Instead of channeling useless DLV signals, the other
two allow one to change outcomes and retain power.
Anger is usually associated with past pain and not exclusively linked to one occurrence.
To view emotional outbursts as more of attempted power grabs instead of personal slights
enables the individual to ignore the insult. Furthermore, the discipline from coding troublesome
interactions in one’s mind immediately as they occur as the variables DHV, DLV, IOD, IOI, and
CT gives one an amazing sense of clarity and capability to deal with the problem. For example, if
someone is yelling they are DLV or IOD signaling. The options are IOI them to incite anger, IOD
them for parity, DHV to reframe out of the situation, or compliance test to see if that will make
them stop yelling.
By yelling the offender tries to ensnare the offended and cause the offended’s social value
to sink below that of the offender out of a sense of helplessness. Compliance with the offender’s
demands is probably the worst of the five main options, especially if the offended’s goal is to
gain power over the offender. Powerful people are powerful because they have options in
behavior, choices in associates, and always the ability to walk away. Anger serves to cut off one’s
choices because it puts emotional blinders on rational thought. However, provoking anger is a
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double-edged sword in that if victory is not certain then it is unwise to be the provocateur.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Preface
One of the lessons learned from this thesis in terms of understanding social dynamics is
that in a trite phrase, less is more. The elites most effectively displaying leadership qualities were
the ones able to say more with fewer words. Bush grasped for words when answering the
audience participant while Clinton expressed sympathy while reframing out of her negative
feelings. Across the three case studies, it was evident that from very short snippets of
interactions, the reader could get a good sense of when politicians were in their element and
when they were not. The signals varied dramatically from interaction to interaction and short
sound bites had the ability to make or break elites’ images – the presence of fleeting display of
leadership qualities. Usually, the mode of interactions consists of IOI signals and IOD signals,
which is where individuals indicate their preferences (Odom 2008). At other times, people signal
compliance tests to others to better understand others’ preferences as well as clarification or
information spreading protocols that are outside the scope of this study (marked with N/A).
Congruent and consistent DHV signals indicate leadership qualities. On the contrary, DLV
signals wreck credibility and indicate weakness and illegitimacy. These two signals carry a much
heavier reward/loss value than the rest. Simplistically, the one benefiting most from interactions
can be determined by measuring who manifested the most frequent and potent DHV signals
when breaking the distribution down by actor. Once DHV blocks are present, especially in
conjunction with consistent, congruent nonverbal behavior, there is hardly a need to evaluate
interaction variables unless that same person/actor begins to manifest DLV signals. A few wellplaced DHV signals without the presence of DLV signals exhibits authority, leadership, and
power.
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Louis XIV was known for using the concept “less is more” to expand his power. His
nobles spent days deliberating, forming and reforming alliances, and arguing like a boiling pot of
water until they were ready to involve Louis. Louis decided the matter with absolute authority
but the nobles could not figure out what would appeal to Louis and what would irritate him. The
nobles did not know how and when to approach him and he did not allow them to read his
emotions. He had a mask of neutrality and mystery on when they explained the issues – always
being very careful with their wording and exposing the matter in great detail. Louis always
responded with the same answer “I shall see” and speak no more on the matter (Greene 1998).
With the application of the interaction signals, Louis gave very few signals in general. He did not
indicate his preferences with an abundance of IOI and IOD signals so the ministers and nobles
knew how to best DHV signal in front of him. Since they felt their status was less than his, they
indicated compliance and pliability due to the lack of signals. When Louis was ready to act, he
did so with decisiveness and rapidity so his actions to him always showed DHV signals. He
acted congruently with his famous terse signature phrase: “I am the state.” Generally, short
answers put people on the defensive and invite them to jump in to fill the silence with nervous
comments that may divulge valuable information and even weaknesses but this has a limit. This
works only when the people talking want to be pleasing or are already impressed with the
popularity of an individual. It is quite the opposite to remain silent when one is expected to
indicate preferences especially to one’s superiors (Greene 1998).

How Frameworks Fared When Tested
As stated in interaction framework one, the interaction constructs DLV and IOD cannot
mix in repeated sequences or the chance for termination of interaction, outbreak of conflict, or
loss of face value is highly likely. Appendix C shows an example of a conflict pattern under
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slightly different circumstances. An IOD vs. IOD pattern is the simplest form of conflict. A
(DHV & IOD) versus (DLV & IOD) conflict will tilt power or social value profoundly toward
the person who manifests DHV signals.
From the transcript in Appendix C we can determine that Newt Gingrich was able to
endure in light of scandal because of masterful reframing of the event and a combination of
brutal DHV and IOD responses to a weak and reactive DLV and IOD signaling moderator. The
emotions of the audience palpably confirm the contrasting ability and fluctuating face value of
the two “combatants.” Seeing conflict signals with a clear resolution lets us reason that without
the DHV signal to set one side apart from the other, the IOD/DLV signals looping represents
conflict without a clear end. A small piece of this type of interaction is evident toward the end of
Appendix A between Baker, Bush, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev. Table 7 cut out from
Appendix D is shown below for convenience to illustrate this point. Baker, repeatedly treading
on ideological sore spots, finds himself on the receiving end of more IOD signals in rapid
succession than any other American representative. The only time Baker receives an IOI is when
he breaks the IOD/DLV loop with a DHV signal, which is highlighted for emphasis. However,
one DHV signal is not enough to break IOD/DLV loops. The segment of the interaction in Table
7 is consistent with the negative reciprocity that permeates destructive conflict. This is why
repeated DHV signaling is necessary, perhaps in a way along the lines of transformative dialogue
theory from the communications field where repeated recognition signaling is also needed for
couples to break conflict cycles (Davis 2006). Although dyadic relationships may seem
unrelated, similar signaling patterns are apparent despite a diverse and different set of
environmental settings and communication styles.
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Table 7: Excerpt from Appendix D
Gorbachev: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: IOD
Baker: DLV
Gorbachev: IOD to Baker
Gorbachev: IOD to Baker
Bush: IOI to Gorbachev
Baker: CT
Baker: attempted DHV
Gorbachev: strong IOD to
Baker
Gorbachev: IOD to Baker
Bush: CT
Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Yakovlev: IOD, DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Bush/Baker
Bush: CT

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: CT

Bush: IOD
Shevardnadze: IOD to Bush
Scowcroft: DHV

Shevardnadze: IOD to Baker
Gorbachev: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Bush: IOI to Shevardnadze
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to Baker

Gorbachev: CT

Baker: IOD to Shevardnadze

In framework two it is stated that when an IOI given in good faith is answered with an
IOD the offended is likely to manifest repeated IOD or DLV signals. This includes the modifier
that if the offender receives IOD signals (especially when paired with DHV) then the offended
perceives his/her position as one of strength relative to the offender. If the offender receives DLV
signals then the offended perceives his/her position as one of weakness relative to the offender.
Newt Gingrich exuded DHV and IOD signals of both verbal and nonverbal nature congruently
and expressed very convincingly that he perceived his position as one of overwhelming strength
relative to that of King. He was so sure of this that he carried the support of the crowd.
In framework three it is posited that a threat to one’s social status, perceived or material,
can and is likely to lead to the IOD/(IOD&DLV) cycle known in modern communication
literature as negative reciprocated behavior 27 or destructive conflict because it can trigger the
fight-or-flight reflex. This concept is known as the Brown-Levinson Theory of Politeness or
27

See Oetzel & Ting Toomey, 2006 pp. 200-202 and note the IODs and DLVs flying back and forth in conversation
transcribed by Canary, Gustafson, and Mikesell, 1999. In this conversation, a couple engages in negative
reciprocative behavior engaging in a DLV-IOD conflict cycle.
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more broadly, facework theory (Littlejohn, 1996). This worked in Chapter Four where Bush was
completely unbalanced by the question. Bush lost face value in front of the Audience Participant
in a kind of fight-or-flight interaction where his nonverbal signals were expressing flight and his
verbal signals were expressing fight. Not only does this demonstrate a lack of congruence in
messages, it also illustrates in a practical way how the IOD/DLV cycle leads to a loss of face
value.
Framework four states that beginning interactions by giving the receiver an IOI as
opposed to neutrality or an IOD implicitly awards advantage to the receiver of the IOI. Giving a
free IOI lends the receiver an unspoken edge if the receiver is a stranger. Remember that an IOI
can indicate compliance, attraction, valuing another person more than one’s self in sexual
applications, and valuing another person at least equal in all other applications. However opening
with an IOI can be done in formal situations where the decorum is to treat each other with
courtesy. The reason is that an IOI opener lends the receiver an unspoken edge is because simply
to approach someone new connotes that they must have intrinsic value in the eyes of the person
giving the IOI.
Appendix A shows a great example of interaction where decorum is such that IOIs are
standard. This makes it more difficult for the interpreter to see where an IOI is part of baseline
behavior and where it is part of genuine compliance and progress toward the objective. Both
participants (Gorbachev and Bush) are of roughly equal standing and this is evident by their
careful and calculated words to each other.
Framework five stated that in order to achieve any goal through interaction with others,
compliance tests are necessary, bridging elements that determine which direction interaction will
take. If the receiver of a compliance test fails the test by responding with an IOD then the tester
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can reply with any block except an IOI even at the risk of an IOD loop (conflict). The person
who responds with a DLV implicitly believes that the compliance tester is stronger and will give
in or else deception is present and he/she is trying to trick the compliance tester with a false
reading. The key is to keep escalating with greater demands until trust is either established or
deception is discovered. If deception is discovered, it is the same thing as the receiver of the
compliance test resisting and failing the test. This can be tested by looking for patterns of
interaction when coding transcripts in conjunction with video recordings (if available) of with
the five aforementioned definitions. Figure 2 proved to be too simplified of a figure to express
successful interaction. While parts of the flowchart shown in Figure 2 did appear in some of the
test cases there was not a fluid cyclical display like expected. Instead, there are parts of the cycle
with interruptions from other participants which prohibit a smooth cycle. Politicians in particular
are very proficient at reframing interactions with their own compliance tests without allowing the
other party to run a full cycle as shown in Figure 2.
In framework six it is posited that frequency changes of any interaction construct (IOD,
IOI, DLV, DHV) indicate changes of how well or poorly one communicator is receiving and
feeling about the way a given interaction is going. This was evident slightly in the transcript in
Appendix A when Baker, Shevardnadze, Scowcroft, and Yakovlev entered the discussion the
tensions of both sides became evident. In the transcript in Appendix B the contrasting signals of
Bush and Clinton in terms of both frequency and type indicated how the interaction was going
with the audience member. Bush’s responses were largely frequent, congruent IODs and DLVs.
By contrast Clinton’s was slower with a masterful reframing and DHV and congruent nonverbal
signals.
Baseline behavior becomes very important for judging whether trust is being built. For
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instance if IOIs are rapidly being exchanged back and forth but no real agreements are being
reached then the IOIs are pretty meaningless and part of baseline behavior (like background
noise in an analog signal). In a practical example, Americans tend to smile a lot compared to
Eastern Europeans so a smile from a stranger in America is by and large inconsequential as a
single signal. The smile could be a either a courtesy or a significant IOI requiring escalation and
compliance testing, but in Eastern Europe a smile matters much more because the baseline tends
toward infrequent smiling and is generally a significant IOI. Therefore, understanding cultural
differences comes into play for the purpose of baselining norms to communicate most
effectively.
The framworkers were generally too simple in their scope. Real interactions do not
complete full cycles as shown in Figure 2 unless a conversation participant is very compliant and
fully jumps through another’s conversational hoops. The elites in the case studies tended to
reframe out of being too compliant even though the mode could still be the IOI signal. The
possibility of conflict as being beneficial to one side was not explored in the hypotheses but
clearly demonstrated in the fifth case study. Conflict is preferable to loss of face value and
actually a viable method for gaining value if the proper interaction variables are used. Ultimately
congruence testing determines whether or not an individual keeps or loses his or her advantage.
No person who displays consistent DHV signals is safe. Someone will always rise to the
challenge and like an alpha wolf the challenged must assert that yes in fact he is still the head
wolf.

Future Work & Limitations
Future research would involve trying to quantify the interaction variables mathematically
in order to measure the signal strength of leadership qualities versus merely a binary presence or
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absence of the phenomena. An example of how this valuation system might look is shown in
Table 8. In addition, fully coding the parts of nonverbal signal patterns could prove useful,
particularly when the signals are not congruent. This adds to the proper weighing scheme that is
absent from this preliminary work.
Table 8: Interaction Variables Coded Numerically
Interaction Variable
Estimated Numerical Value
DHV
+3 ± [value n contingent upon correct use,
relative to social standing of the other actor(s)]
DLV
-3 ± [value n contingent upon correct use,
relative to social standing of the other actor(s)]
CT
0
IOI
-1 ± [value n contingent upon correct use,
relative to social standing of the other actor(s)]
IOD
+1 ± [value n contingent upon correct use,
relative to social standing of the other actor(s)]
Accurate coding of the variables depends mostly on nonverbal cues and seemingly
neutral communication can yield big changes in face value. The weakness of the coding method
used in this thesis is that it does not include a way to code for the intensity of the interaction
variable that is easily transferable so another scholar can understand it. This is to say, there is no
implemented weighing system for verbal and nonverbal signals. The case studies were chosen
for their diversity and for their homogeneity congruent signaling. A case where the speaker is
attempting to deceive would require the scholar to weigh tonal and physical nonverbal signals
against the verbal to gauge which ones are most truthful. This weighed approach is outside the
scope of this study. Another shortcoming is that few transcripts come with full body video of the
interaction. To compensate at least in part, and to capture meaningful changes in frequency and
patterns, appendix A had to be five times longer than appendices B and C where the video
enabled for easier verification of message congruence. The body language matched the verbal
message. Just by reading the transcript in Appendix B, it makes no sense why Clinton’s message
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was so effective without seeing and hearing the nonverbal components of his delivery. In the
Appendices, the videos on YouTube, which are linked, allowed for easy coding of the interaction
types described.
This research only covers value in terms of power but says nothing of other moral
systems. Regardless of leadership style, one can attain power by attaining maximum social status
in the eyes of the general population by correctly retaining and building face value. A religious
person might say that one should not maximize for this and lose face value where necessary just
to avoid conflict. The theory is made to broaden understanding and not to make moral choices.
Although the approach to studying political leadership qualities may take additional fine
tuning and is not yet equipped to measure intensity, it should be a helpful yardstick for
measuring both verbal and nonverbal behavior with some solid operationalizable definitions to
perform further tests on all manner of political phenomena. Using it to express the absence and
presence of a given trait is just a start. For example, other questions arise like: what combinations
of signals under the defined terms lead to success in debates – is it the display of leadership
qualities or something more? Does the reactivity of a participant lead to him or her losing a
debate? Candidate personality, as represented on television, predominates in voter choice (Saad
2007). This means that political leadership qualities based on the defined variables (if accurate
representations of how the emotional subconscious works) could help both the study and
practical implementation of both congruent and accurate messages by scholars and politicians the
world over. Stewart (2008) for instance cites the need for practical definitions of subliminal
messages for regulatory purposes as abuse is likely to increase by corporations or unscrupulous
campaigns. This abuse is particularly prevalent with stimuli that play upon evolutionarily
relevant concerns, such as survival and social standing (Stewart 2008, p. 221).
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Finally, I would like to expand the base of cases in future research to include other socioeconomic variables; particularly gender, sexual orientation, income level, education, and so on so
that the theory can be tested against a wide variety of backgrounds as well as greatly increasing
the number of cases for gauging outcomes of election debates. This starts with evaluating entire
televised debates and seeing how likely candidates who displayed leadership qualities (as defined
with the concepts developed in this thesis) to win elections. It would be useful to see if leaders in
the political sphere engage in the same tactics to attract followers as do people from other walks
of life, especially in business. Failure to see a desired reaction from the correct pattern may show
that this system is flawed or may be attributed to the fact that this is a probabilistic relationship
and in this particular instance other variables intervened. That is why a large number of cases and
testing for statistical significance will be necessary in future research. It is a valid criticism to
wonder which of these situations occurred. Unfortunately, this particular study cannot answer
this question. A future study utilizing a large n data set may be able to explain the deeper of this
probabilistic relationship. This particular study is meant to be an introductory paper to this
system of analysis but future work would lead to more accurate results.
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APPENDIX A: MALTA SUMMIT TRANSCRIPT
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Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit
December 2-3, 1989
First Plenary session, December 2.
Italicized text highlights key parts of interactions and validates coding selections if necessary.
(IOI, complimenting and verbally rewarding) Gorbachev: Welcome, Mr. President,
and members of the American delegation, aboard the Soviet cruise ship Maxim Gorky. It was
you who took the initiative for organizing this meeting between us. I would first like to say that
we regard the president’s initiative highly.
(passive IOI, accepting the compliment) Bush: Thank you very much.
(IOI, requesting rapport) Gorbachev: I have been thinking: what has happened in world
developments that has prompted the USSR and the U.S. to meet like this? Not only what has
happened, but that so much is happening. That is the important thing. For that reason we need to
find a new, deep dialogue, one that will be integrally linked with those changes and new events
that need to be faced in the international arena. We must conduct our affairs in some other way;
we must address the changes. Therefore, we can no longer limit the active work being conducted
to the level of foreign ministers. Life demands that we organize more frequent working meetings
and increase contacts between our nations' leaders...
(IOI, accepting request for rapport, saying both wanted to achieve fellowship) Bush:
Thank you for your kind words. It was I who came forward with the suggestion for this meeting.
But I proceeded along the assumption that such negotiations would be acceptable to the Soviet
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side as well. Therefore, I feel that we prepared this meeting together. When I was on my
way from Paris to Washington this past summer and was on the plane editing the draft of
my letter to you concerning this meeting, I realized that I would be changing my former
12 position 180 degrees. This change in our approach was understood by the American
people. Since the idea of this summit was proposed, many important events have taken
place in the international arena. I expect that during the forthcoming exchange we will be
able to share our views of these changes, not only in Eastern Europe but in other regions
as well, in order to come to a better and deeper understanding of our respective positions.
I am in favor of an exchange not only in the presence of our delegations, but also one-onone. I think that we should meet more often.
(IOI confirming relations) Gorbachev: I agree. I have a feeling that we have
already talked and that this meeting is a continuation of our useful discussions.
(IOI agreement with CT asking for permission to steer discussion) Bush: Yes,
that's right. We have already had productive discussions. I would like, if you will permit
me, to outline some of the thoughts of the American side. I fully agree with what you
have stated regarding the importance of our meeting on Malta. I was prepared to make
similar points. Therefore, I will not repeat them...
(IOI compliance) Gorbachev: I agree.
(Compliance test or CT, conditional language or drawing attention to details
to evoke compliance. In closing, welcomes cooperation explicitly making this a CT)
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Bush: You know that my administration is in favor of eliminating chemical weapons from
mankind. Today I want to state our new proposal, which contains a certain new element. If the
Soviet side will give its agreement in principle to our proposal on the issue of chemical weapons,
which was set forth in my speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September, then
within the framework of this approach the U.S. could agree to abandon our program of
modernization, that is, the [program of] further production of binary weapons after
comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons would enter into force. In
practical terms this would mean that in the near future the two sides could come to agreement on
a significant reduction in supplies of chemical weapons, bringing to 20 percent the current figure
on chemical agents in the U.S. arsenal, and, eight years after entering into the arms convention,
[bringing it down] to 2 percent. We propose to carry out the plan so that by the time of the
summit meeting in the U.S. in the middle of next year the draft of a bilateral agreement would be
ready, and it could be signed at that time. On conventional weapons. Although this matter
requires serious work connected, among other things, with the necessity of overcoming certain
barriers not only in our countries but in other countries, for example in France, we could expect
to reach an agreement sometime next year. I think that in this connection, we could set the
following goal: to aim toward signing an agreement in 1990 on radical reductions in
conventional forces in Europe, having obtained signatures on such an agreement during the
summit meeting of representatives of the countries participating in the Vienna negotiations.
On the issue of a future treaty for the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The
American side seeks to provide the proper initiative for negotiations on that matter. We are in
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favor of jointly resolving all outstanding key issues for the forthcoming summit meeting
in the U.S. We are also not excluding the possibility that by then the draft treaty on
reducing strategic offensive weapons and its attachments will be agreed upon in full. In
this case, the treaty could be signed in the course of the summit meeting. We are hopeful
that at the forthcoming Soviet-American talks between our foreign ministers a solution
might be found in the near future to issues such as a procedure for accounting for longrange air-launched cruise missiles, telemetry encryption, restrictions on non-deployed
missiles, etc. On the eve of the meeting between our foreign ministers, which could take
place at the end of January, the American side is planning to formulate its position on
these questions and to offer it at these negotiations. We are also planning to provide
instructions to our delegation at the Geneva negotiations to withdraw the previous
American proposal on banning mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. I would like to
ask the Soviet side to turn once again to the issue of restrictions on SS-18 intercontinental
ballistic missiles. We would like to prohibit the modernization of these missiles and
would like the Soviet side to explore the possibility of deeper unilateral reductions.
Regarding preparatory protocols to the treaties of 1974-1976 on underground nuclear
testing, there is, in our opinion, every possibility for completing this work soon and
signing the stated protocols at our meeting in the U.S. It is becoming increasingly
important at the present time to find a solution to the problem of preventing the
proliferation of missiles and missile technology. In this regard the United States would
welcome the Soviet Union’s joining the arms limitation convention to which seven
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Western nations already belong.
(Passive IOD/IOI depends on tone, new CT imminent) Gorbachev: This issue is
already under discussion.
(CT, qualification seeking DLV, providing proof before any was required.) Bush: We
would like to raise the question of whether it would be possible for the Soviet Union to publish
roughly the same amount of data on the Soviet military budget as we do in the United States. I
think that our publications give quite a comprehensive idea of the kind of military activity
undertaken in our country. I am sure that your intelligence services can confirm this
authoritatively.
(IOD, compliance threshold reached) Gorbachev: They report to me, on the contrary,
that you do not publish everything.
(Easier CT, low politics issues) Bush: I am certain that the publication of more detailed
data on military budgets, on a mutual basis, would encourage trust in this sphere.
I would like to touch on a few questions which are important for the future ...
Particularly critical at the present time are problems of environmental protection. We are
now forced to take into account even the economic consequences of global climate changes.
Some Western countries are going so far as to drastically curtail even essential economic activity
for the sake of averting these changes. We are trying to approach these issues rationally, to avoid
extremes. At the present time, the USSR and the U.S. are working actively on a committee
preparing an international conference on the climate under the aegis of the U.N. This is bringing
satisfactory results. Looking ahead, we are planning two more important steps in this direction.
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First, after the committee work is finished by autumn of next year we intend to host a
conference to draw up a limited treaty on climate change. Environmental protection
demands the attention of leading scientists. I have asked the White House Assistant for
Science [and Technology], Director [B]romley, to organize a conference for next spring
on the environment, to bring together the finest scientific minds as well as leaders of
appropriate departments from many countries. I hope that Soviet representatives will also
attend this forum. The development of cooperation between our countries depends
largely on the participation of young people in this process. Here student exchanges are
intended to play a great role. We suggest making arrangements so that in the 1990-91
school year, this type of exchange could be increased to approximately 1,000 persons
from each side. The expanded program would involve young people up to 25 years of
age. In addition, special attention should be paid to student exchanges in the humanities
and sociology. The practical experience would be very productive with respect to
agricultural studies programs.
(IOI, reframing into CT, Gorbachev appreciates Bush’s approach finally on
an issue of common ground. Then Gorbachev launches into reframing, painting
Bush in contrast to hawkish, traditional Cold Warrior thought and seeks to further
mutual trust and cooperation) Gorbachev: Thank you for sharing these interesting
ideas. This is possibly the best proof of the fact that President Bush's administration has
set its political focus along Soviet-American lines. I intend to touch on some specific
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issues a little later. Now I would like to make some observations of a general philosophical
nature. It seems very important to me that we talk about the conclusions we can reach from our
past experience, from the “Cold War”--what took place, what will linger in history. Such, if you
wish, is the advantage of the historical process. But trying to analyze the course of past events is
our primary obligation. Why is this necessary? We can probably assert that we have all lived
through a historic turning point. Entirely new problems, of which people in the past could not
even conceive, have arisen before mankind. And so--are we going to resolve them using old
approaches? Absolutely nothing would come of that. By no means is everything that has
happened to be considered in a negative light. For 45 years we succeeded in preventing a major
war. This fact alone shows that in the past all was not bad. But all the same, the conclusion is
obvious--the emphasis on force, on military superiority, and along with it the arms race, has not
justified itself. Both our countries apparently understand this better than any of the others.
The emphasis on ideological confrontation did not justify itself either and resulted only in
our continual criticism of each other. We reached a dangerous line. And it is good that we knew
enough to stop. It is good that a mutual understanding has arisen between our countries. And the
emphasis on the uneven exchange between developed and underdeveloped nations is also being
weakened. In what way? The colonial powers gained a lot from that relationship. But so many
problems arose in the developing world, problems that are literally taking us by the throat.
Indeed everything is interrelated.
On the strategic level, Cold War methods and confrontations have suffered defeat. We

85

recognize that. And perhaps it is even better recognized by the general public. I am not
going to start preaching. It is just that people are rushing into politics. Problems have
arisen with respect to the environment and the preservation of natural resources that are
linked to the ill effects of technological progress. And this is entirely understandable-after all, this is essentially about the problem of survival. Public opinion of this kind has
a strong effect on us politicians as well. Therefore we--in the USSR and in the U.S.--can
do a lot together at this stage to alter radically our old approaches. We were aware of this
in our dealings with the Reagan administration. The process is continuing now. And look
at how we have opened up to each other. On the political level, we lag behind the public
mood. And this is understandable--after all, there are many forces acting on political
leaders. It is good that Marshal [Sergey] Akhromeyev and your adviser, [Brent]
Scowcroft, understand the problems arising in the military sphere. But in both countries
there are people--and a considerable number--who simply frighten us.
In the area of defense there are many people who are accustomed to their
profession and who do not find it easy to change their way of thinking. But this process
has begun all the same. Why have I started off with this topic? In American political
circles a certain premise is persistently put forward: the Soviet Union, they say, began its
perestroika and is changing direction under the influence of Cold War politicians. It is
said that in Eastern Europe everything is collapsing and, they say, that also supports the
self- righteousness of those who relied on Cold War methods. And since this is so, then
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no political changes need to be made. What needs to be done is to increase the force of
oppression and prepare more baskets for reaping the fruits [of this approach]. Mr. President, this
is a very dangerous misconception. I realize that you see all this. I know that you have to listen
to representatives of various circles. However, your public announcements and the concrete
proposals you put forth today, which are aimed at developing cooperation between the USSR
and the U.S., signify that President Bush has formulated a conception of the world that meets
today's challenges.
It goes without saying that each person makes his own choices. But it is also clear that as
far as relations between the USSR and the U.S. are concerned, mistakes and errors in politics are
unacceptable. We must not let our politics be built on misconceptions either in relations with
each other or in relations with other countries.
At first I even considered delivering some sort of reproach--saying that the U.S. president
time and again has expressed his support of perestroika and wished it well and has commented
that the Soviet Union should carry out its reforms on its own; but that we expected from the
president of the United States not only a statement but also concrete action to back up the
statement. Now there is both a statement and an action. I come to this conclusion having listened
to what you just said. Even if this means only plans for action, it is very important.
My second consideration. The world is experiencing a major regrouping of forces. It is
clear that we are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Whether we want to or not, we
will have to deal with a united, economically integrated Europe. We could discuss the issue of
Eastern Europe separately. Whether we like it or not, Japan is another center of world politics.
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We once discussed China. This is another most serious reality, which neither of us
should exploit against the other. And we must think about how not to make China feel
excluded from the processes that are taking place in the world.
All these, I repeat, are major factors in the regrouping of forces in the world. I am
watching political developments in India--these politics are dynamic. I have spoken at
length with Rajiv Gandhi. India has a balanced approach aimed at establishing good
relations both with us and with you.
What role do we play in this regrouping? Very serious things follow from this. I
began discussing this question with [George] Shultz. After one of the discussions he
showed us some diagrams reflecting changes that will occur at the end of the century in
economic relations between the leading countries of the world. Now it is simply essential
to understand the role of the USSR and the U.S. in these major changes. The changes
cannot always be accompanied by a peaceful flow of events Take Eastern Europe. Its
specific share in the world economy is not very large. And look at how nervous we are.
What form of action should we take? Collective action? And what lies ahead in terms of
economics, the environment, and other problems? We must think about this together, too.
For a long time the Soviet leadership has pondered this. And we are coming to the
conclusion that the U.S. and the USSR are simply “doomed” to dialogue, joint action,
and cooperation. It cannot be otherwise. But for this to happen we must stop viewing
each other as enemies. There is a lot of this in our heads. We must take care not to look at
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our relations solely from a military standpoint. This does not mean that we are suggesting a
Soviet-American condominium. This is about realities. And this in no way puts into question
allied relations or cooperation that have built up with other countries. We need to understand all
this. I do not think that this was there before. We have just now entered the process of mutual
understanding. We have asked the question: what kind of Soviet Union is in the U.S. interest-the dynamic, stable, solid one or the one struggling with all kinds of problems? I am informed
about the advice you have been receiving. As far as we are concerned, we are interested in a
U.S. that feels confident in the decisions it makes on national security and progress. This thought
is present in all discussions with my Western partners. And there have been hundreds of such
meetings. I believe that any other approach is dangerous. Ignoring domestic political processes,
an unwillingness to take into account the practical interests of the U.S. in the world--that is a
dangerous policy.
And the U.S. must take into account the interests of other countries. Meanwhile, there is
still a desire to teach, oppress, and step on throats. It is still there. We all know this. Therefore, I
would like to hear your opinion on this. For the question is how to build a bridge between our
countries--across the river or down its course. Since there is much time remaining in the
president's leadership of the U.S., this point must be made clear. I think that we will not achieve
this in just one meeting. But the main issues must be sorted out. I repeat: we need clarity. All the
rest is concrete detail, specifics that in the final analysis are integrally linked to mutual
understanding on these basic problems ...
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(IOI, showing that the Soviet Union’s face value is important. Calibration,
distancing from hawkish behavior but in a reserved way, neither with the hawks or
doves) Bush: I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been
going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending statements aimed at
damaging the Soviet Union. At the same time, there are people in the United States who
accuse me of being too cautious. It is true, I am a cautious man, but I am not a coward;
and my administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your
position in the world. But I was persistently advised to do something of that sort--to
climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations.
My administration, however, is avoiding these steps; we are in favor of reserved
behavior.
(IOI sharing how he appreciates Bush’s direction. CT on various issues of
importance to the face value of both superpowers ending with the issue of
disarmament.) Gorbachev: ... I want to reply to the views you expressed at the
beginning of the discussion. I welcome your words. I regard them as a manifestation of
political will. This is important to me. From my own experience, and the experience of
working with President Reagan, I know how we found ourselves more than once in a
situation concerning disarmament where everything came to a halt and was stuck in the
mud. The delegations sat in Geneva sipping coffee, and there was nothing to do. At that
time I received a message from President Reagan. I read the text carefully and concluded
that nothing would come of it. Of course, I could have written a formal reply but I do not
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like wasting words. I had to make a decisive move. And that is how the idea arose for a meeting
in Reykjavik. Some people were frightened by the results of the Reykjavik talks. But in reality
Reykjavik became a genuine breakthrough on questions of arms limitation. After this, the
mechanism for negotiations began to work actively and effectively. Or take another area-economic ties. Here there are limited possibilities for advancement. In order to overcome these
limitations, political will is needed. A signal is needed from the president. American
businessmen are disciplined people, and as soon as they see a new way of thinking in the
economic sphere, they respond very quickly.
At the Geneva talks, the delegations squeezed literally everything they could from the
directives given to them. It is essential to give impetus to all work. I noted your views in this
connection. They appear to me to be worthy of attention. I thank you for placing top priority on
the question of bilateral cooperation. We are prepared to discuss all issues related to this. The
following situation often arises: when discussing relations between our countries, we are told:
“Come to an agreement with the Americans, we will support you.” But as soon as we start to
negotiate, they scream: “A new Yalta.” That is somewhat natural. Much depends on our work
with our allies, and with the non-aligned countries.
We will move to adapt our economy to the world economy. Therefore we consider it
important to be part of the GATT system and other international economic organizations. We
believe that this will be useful to our perestroika, and will allow us to understand better how the
world economic mechanism functions. In the past, the U.S. took a negative stand on the question
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of the USSR’s participation in international economic organizations. It was said that
participation in the GATT would politicize this organization’s activity. I think that this is
a vestige of old approaches. There really was a time when we placed ideological issues in
the forefront. By the way, you did, too. Now times have changed, there are other criteria,
other processes, and there will be no return to the old ways.

... We are allowing for the possibility in our country of various forms of private
property. We will aim toward making the ruble convertible. Perestroika is also happening
within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in order to bring
this organization's operational principles closer to generally accepted world economic
standards.
Now, on Central America. We see how you perceive the situation in Latin
America. But it is not quite clear to us what you want from Nicaragua. There is political
pluralism in that country, there are more parties there than in the United States. And the
Sandinistas--what kind of Marxists are they?! This is laughable. Where are the roots of
the problem? At the core are economic and social issues. Why does the U.S. fail to see
them? You say that the main problem in Nicaragua is the question of power. Well, there
will be elections there. Let the United Nations monitor them. Frankly speaking, it is not
our business. Let this process go where it will.
On Cuba. Cuba came into being without our assistance. Rather, it was the United
States that played some role in that. When the new Cuba was born, we learned about it
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from the newspapers. But let us not touch on history. The issue now is how to improve the
current situation. There is a simple and well-proven method: one has to speak directly to Castro.
You must learn: nobody can lord themselves over Castro. He has his own ideas about our
perestroika, too.
I want to emphasize again: we are not pursuing any goals in Central America. We do not
want to acquire bases or strongholds there. You should be assured about this.
Let us return to the problem of disarmament. We are familiar with the U.S. approach to
solving the problem of chemical weapons. However, in the past this approach has been missing
an important element--a U.S. readiness to curtail production of binary weapons after the
convention banning chemical weapons went into effect. Now this element has appeared, and that
is very substantial. There has been progress here.
Therefore we, you and we, believe that a global ban is essential. We hold to this goal. But
there are two-sided measures and definite stages to be negotiated. Our foreign ministers can
discuss this.
(IOI in agreement with issues into a CT imploring experts to discuss the issues.)
Bush: The issue of nonproliferation of chemical weapons is also highly critical. I hope that our
experts will touch on this subject.
(IOI, agreement into CT on the issue of strategic weapons that are important to the
USSR, testing if cooperation is deep or on the surface only.) Gorbachev: I agree.
Now on the Vienna negotiations and the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. You
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came out in favor of concluding an agreement on this most important issue in 1990 and
on its signing at the highest level. Our approaches here coincided. We are ready for active
and constructive cooperation to attain this goal. There are difficulties, of course. But I
will not elaborate on the details.
On negotiations for limiting strategic weapons. Here political will is needed to
give impetus to the work being done. I listened to you attentively, and you emphasized
some of the elements. But, unfortunately, I did not hear you mention the problem of sealaunched cruise missiles.
Now the climate is favorable for preparing a draft treaty on the reduction of
strategic offensive weapons for signature by the time of our meeting next year. And if by
this time a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles has not been found,
then a serious difficulty will arise. Here you are at a great advantage. The American side
must consider this question again in the context I mentioned.
(IOI, agreeing with difficulty presented and the need to take action.) Bush:
That is a problem.
(IOI, confirming direction of the discussion into conclusion) Gorbachev: We
are not trying to achieve mirror symmetry. Each side has a choice; there is the situation
of the country to consider, the different structures of the armed forces. But in working
toward a reduction of strategic offensive weapons, it is impossible to ignore sea-launched
cruise missiles. The U.S. has a serious advantage in this area. Put yourselves in our
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position. Our Supreme Soviet will not agree to the ratification of a treaty if it avoids the problem
of sea-launched cruise missiles.
I very much welcome your proposals on the environment. You can expect our experts to
take an active part in the conference on environmental issues planned by the White House. I am
glad that you touched on the question of increasing student exchanges. We began this good work
during Reagan’s presidency. For young people it is easier to find a common language. And I am
sure that they will make a contribution toward the positive development of Soviet-American
relations.
In summary, I would like once again to emphasize that I am happy with the steps that you
outlined here. The Soviet-American dialogue is gaining a certain momentum. And to give it a
new breath, new efforts and new steps will be necessary ...
---------------------------------------First private session.
Record of conversation between General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev and President George Bush (one-on-one) December 2, 1989
(Conspiracy frame 28 CT, mentioning confidential conversation) Gorbachev: In our
confidential conversation, I would like to raise three issues:
First, the issue of Central America, primarily Cuba. Mr. President, perhaps you
remember that after my visit to Cuba I wrote a letter to you. My talks there were not simple. I
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Conspiracy frame refers to a shared frame of reference or point of connection between the interlocutors that only
they know about. This is usually done to build trust. It is also a DHV.
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must admit that Castro expressed a certain concern regarding our course. We clarified a
number of issues for him, and in general everything ended well. Among other things, we
said to him: What we are doing in our country is dictated by our needs. What you are
doing in your country is your business; we are not interfering with it.
In a one-on-one conversation, Castro essentially asked for our assistance with the
normalization of relations with the U.S. Recently the chief of staff of the Cuban Air
Force visited the Soviet Union. He talked with [officials] at the Defense Ministry of the
USSR, as well as with Marshal Akhromeyev. And he confidentially repeated this request.
I am confiding it to you in a one-on-one conversation and hope that this will remain
between us. Otherwise Castro’s reaction may be rather strong.
(compliance, IOI, wanting Gorbachev to feel at ease and empathizing with
him) Bush: Certainly. I am not going to put you in an embarrassing situation. There
cannot be leaks from my side. I understand how delicate this matter is for you.
(CT, asking Bush to commit to something) Gorbachev: Perhaps we should
think about some kind of mechanism to begin contacts on this issue. We are ready to
participate, but perhaps it will be unnecessary. It is up to you to decide. We are ready to
assist you in starting the dialogue, but it is certainly your business, and I could only ask
you to think about it.
It seems to me that Castro understands how much the world has been changing. I
felt it in my conversation with him. But he has a remarkably strong sense of self-esteem
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and independence.
(reframing, because he does not engage the compliance test directly but wants
clarification on Gorbachev’s offer) Bush: Could you please repeat verbatim what he told you.
(CT, will the US normalize relations with Cuba) Gorbachev: His words were the
following: During your contacts with the president, we request that you find the ways and means
to convey Cuba’s interest in normalizing relations with the United States. That is what I have
done just now.
(IOD, not buying anything to do with Castro and further implying that Soviet
weapons in the region cause unrest.) Bush: I would like, so to speak, to show you all my cards
on Central America and on Cuba. If we take our NATO allies, including Thatcher, Kohl,
Mitterrand, in general they do not care about Central America. Of course, they say good words
about democratization and free elections, but they have no vital interests in what is going on
there. The same concerns the “left flank” of the American body politic. However, young
fledgling democracies to the south of the Rio Grande, as well as the overwhelming majority of
American people, take this issue very close to heart.
We see also that, compared to your movement forward, Castro looks like an anchor
which makes this movement more difficult. This man is clearly out of step with the changes and
processes that have enveloped the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and our hemisphere.
Democratic changes are alien to him.
The leaders of Latin American countries, of course, avoid criticizing other Latin
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Americans in the United Nations. Therefore I was surprised when Costa Rican President
Oscar Arias pointed out that Castro was now in complete isolation. Castro poses yet
another grave problem. I am talking about many Cubans who have been expelled from
Cuba and whose relatives in Cuba are being persecuted. Many such Cubans tend to live
in southern Florida, and there passions run high against this man who is considered to be
the worst dictator.
Castro sounded us out before; however, he never followed through with any signs
of readiness to change his behavior. Now, about Nicaragua. You said that the Sandinistas
are not real Marxists. Earlier I had a different opinion, but today I would tend to agree.
Nevertheless, they still export revolution. I am deeply convinced that the “Cessna”
episode was not just an accident. Whatever they say to you, they methodically transfer
arms--here it does not matter from what sources--for the FMLN. I am concerned that
now a new shipment of helicopters from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua is being
delivered, although I do not doubt Mr. Shevardnadze’s declaration regarding the missiles.
Indeed they could get them from other sources.
(IOD, bouncing the same accusation at Bush) Gorbachev: Your weapons are
also in the region.
(reframing, avoid the IOD by answering non-committedly and dropping the
frame into a CT asking for eventual cooperation on the matter.) Bush: This is
possible. We should look for a way to remove this source of tension in our relations. We
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see holding free elections under appropriate monitoring as such a way.
(IOI, compliance) Gorbachev: I agree.
(CT, seeing if on the issue of Panama, Gorbachev is on the same page.) Bush: Today
both of us should hope and pray that free elections will really take place and that [Daniel]
Ortega, if he is not elected, will not try to cling to power somehow with the help of the army. If
there are really free elections certified by a group of foreign observers, then the United States
will accept their results and will in no way attempt to influence or sabotage their outcome. There
is another malignant issue in Latin America; I would say an open wound. I am speaking of
Panama. I must tell you that nobody in the United States believes that the Soviet Union might
have a stake in Noriega’s success. For us he poses a terrible problem. By the way, I inquired of
our attorney general how sound the incriminating evidence against Noriega is.
To tell you frankly, I would be ready to look for a way to give him a chance to leave
without losing face, to alleviate the problem somehow. I am telling you this, of course, in
confidence. However, I received a response that the evidence against him is very convincing
and, considering how acute the issue of drugs in the United States is, we cannot simply dispose
of an official indictment of Noriega.
(IOD, not pleased with the US interfering in affairs abroad.) Gorbachev: I would like
you, Mr. President, to know how the Soviet Union perceives some of your administration’s steps
with regard to such countries as, for instance, Panama, Colombia and, most recently, the
Philippines. In the Soviet Union people ask: The fact that these are sovereign countries--is this
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not a barrier for the United States? Why does the U.S. arrange a trial, reach a verdict
and carry it out by itself?
(N/A, clarifying the issue, not yet answering the question in order to calibrate
response 29) Bush: What do you have in mind when you include Colombia?
(N/A, answering, clarifying nature of the discussion.) Gorbachev: I have in
mind the use of force against the drug business.
(IOD, paralleling actions with how the USSR intervenes in a country – by
request, defending his position without losing value and by calibrating to preserve
Soviet face value at the end.) Bush: Now, we do not carry out any military operations.
But you must have no doubt that when we are asked to help a democratically elected
government in its struggle against the drug-mafia, we will do it. But President [Virgilio]
Barco is a very courageous man and he will not ask us for it. As for the Philippines, your
reaction surprised me.
President [Corazon] Aquino was elected democratically, and now she is being
challenged by a group from the military led by Colonel [Gregorio] Honasan. She asked
for aerial cover for her palace, which was under threat of bombardment. It seems to me
this should not have caused problems for the Soviet Union. And the scale of assistance
was not that large. If this creates problems for the Soviet Union, then at least it is good that you
mentioned it. Otherwise, it would never have occurred to me. In any case, it is not my wish that
such minimal assistance cause difficulties in our relations with the Soviet Union.
29

This is a factual clarification to move the discussion forward.
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(IOD, expressing disagreement) Gorbachev: Some are beginning to speak about the
“Bush Doctrine” that is replacing the “Brezhnev Doctrine.”
(CT, expressing the exceptional nature of the situation, softening the point of
disagreement) Bush: Do they really say so with regard to the Philippines? I simply cannot
understand this. We are talking about the legitimate elected leader. She is asking for help against
an insolent colonel.
(IOI agreement, DHV takes a direct policy comparison reframing the circumstance,
asks how Bush would solve the problem instead of falling into a conflict frame, CT.)
Gorbachev: I agree. However, I think one can explain such a reaction in the context of the
current situation. Just take a look; Europe is changing; governments are falling--governments
that were also elected on a legitimate basis. One wonders if during this power struggle someone
were to ask the Soviet Union to intervene, what should we do? Should we follow the example of
President Bush?
(compliance) Bush: I see.
(CT, explains how he would respond and implicitly invites Bush to agree)
Gorbachev: Sometimes I hear that in the current situation we are not fulfilling our mission with
regard to our friends. I always respond in such cases: first, nobody asked us to help; second, the
changes are proceeding according to the Constitution.
(IOI, agrees that peaceful resolution is the way to go, calibrates at the end to
empathize with Gorbachev’s position.) Bush: I would say more--that it is thanks to you that
they are proceeding peacefully. But there is a big difference between this and a colonel who
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intends to overthrow Aquino.
The whole thing is that changes should come about peacefully. President Aquino
is the very symbol of peaceful change in the Philippines. But I can see how some people
in the Soviet Union might have a different reaction.
(IOI, accepts Bush’s soft response, further accented by mirroring his
wording) Gorbachev: I understand you. We stand for peaceful change; we do not want to
interfere, and we are not interfering in the processes that are taking place. Let the people
themselves decide their future, without external interference. But, you see, such colonels,
such people can pop up in any country.
(IOI shows support for Gorbachev, CT invites Gorbachev to find common
ground on more difficult issues.) Bush: I do not want to sound like an old, bad record,
but let me repeat: public opinion in the U.S. supports you, firmly supports perestroika as
well as your role in the pluralist processes in Eastern Europe: a role that cannot be
reduced merely to restraint, but also is the catalyst for change. But in the eyes of our
people, your continuing assistance to Fidel Castro causes you serious damage. I should
be frank: it is simply incomprehensible. He is opposed to your course. It would be nice if
you could also find a way to terminate this extremely expensive outpouring of assistance
that gives nothing back to you. These billions of dollars you could spend with great
benefit for yourself, while removing this serious element of friction in Soviet- American
relations.
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Yet, even at the risk of contradicting myself, I would say: all this testifies to the fact that
Castro is out of step with you and, therefore, he is not your puppet. People understand this. Well,
in any case, it would be very good to find a way to halt assistance to Cuba and to certain forces
in Central America so that we do not stand divided on such issues as Panama, Nicaragua, and
Cuba.
Positive changes are taking place now in Chile, in other countries of Latin America. And
this is good not only for the United States, but also for democracy and freedom of choice.
Against this background Cuba and Nicaragua stand out like alien bodies, and, besides, they stand
in the way of Soviet-American mutual understanding.
(compliance with most of Latin America, partial IOD with regard to Cuba.)
Gorbachev: The Soviet Union has no plans with regard to spheres of influence in Latin America.
This was and will continue to be the case. This continent is now in motion. You know it better
than I do. I agree with you: the general trend is positive, democratic; dictatorships give way to
democratic forms, although these are young, newly formed democracies with the heavy burden
of the past, and their road will be a difficult one. We sympathize with these processes. We do not
intend to interfere with what is happening.
As to Cuba, we have certain established relations with it; they go back to a certain period
of history characterized by economic blockades, etc. Now we would like gradually to transfer
our economic relations to a normal track. One should not forget that Cuba is a sovereign country
with its own government, its own ambitions and perceptions. It is not up to us to teach Cuba. Let
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them do what they want.
[....]
(CT, inviting Bush to touch on topics in the frame set forth, in the spirit of
cooperation and agreement with the USSR’s policies.) Gorbachev: I would like to say
a few words about reactions and behavior in connection with the events in Eastern
Europe. First of all, I would like to say that the vector of these changes in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union is bringing us closer to each other, and this is the main thing. But
there is an important point. I cannot accept it when some American politicians say that
the process of overcoming the split in Europe should be based on Western values. It
seems that earlier we were blamed for the “export of revolution,” and now they speak
about the export of American values. I believe this goes against the spirit of today’s
changes; it may complicate the processes that are taking place. I wanted to share that
with you, although I know that your position is different.
With regard to the “German Question.” We have the impression that Mr. Kohl
fusses and bustles around too much. He does not act seriously and responsibly. We are
afraid that the topic of reunification may be exploited for electoral gain, that it will not be
strategic factors but the mood of the moment that will take the upper hand. By the way,
opinions in the FRG vary on this issue, both inside the governing coalition and between
the coalition and the Social Democrats. It is important for both of us to convey to
everyone that certain actions may cause damage to constructive processes. Moreover,
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they may put in question very important and serious issues, including trust in the government of
the FRG.
So what would happen? Would a unified Germany be neutral, not a member of any
military-political alliances, or would it be a member of NATO? I believe we should let everyone
understand that it is still too early to discuss either of these options. Let the process take its
course without artificial acceleration.
None of us is responsible for the division of Germany. History occurred this way. Let
history continue to decide on this issue in the future. It seems to me we have developed an
understanding in this regard.
(IOD, similarly to Gorbachev, Bush hints that the US cannot control its satellites
with absolute authority either.) Bush: I believe that in his actions Helmut Kohl was greatly
influenced by an emotional reaction to events. The same concerns Genscher. True, the 10-point
program does have a flavor of electoral political considerations. But we should not overlook the
wave of emotions there. Kohl knows that some Western allies who pay lip service to reunification
when the people of Germany support it are [actually] quite upset by the prospect.
(IOD, while this seems to be some agreement there is some I-You language which
indicates accusation which is effectively disacknowledgment. CT, invites Bush to agree on
the part of the matter where there exists common ground, acting with prudence.)
Gorbachev: Yes, I know about that. And Kohl was informed about this viewpoint. But unlike you
and your allies, I am speaking openly. There are two German states; this is the way history
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happened. Let history decide how the process will develop and what it will lead to in the
context of a new Europe and a new world. Kohl declared repeatedly that he understands
his responsibility and that he will abide by the understandings we reached in Bonn. In
general, this is an issue where we should act with maximum consideration to avoid
hurting the chances that have opened up.
(passive IOI, acknowledging the delicacy of the matter. This indicates Bush is
willing to let the contentious parts of the interaction slide in order to achieve some
common ground.) Bush: I agree. We will not take any rash steps; we will not try to
accelerate the outcome of the debate on reunification. When you speak to Kohl, you will
find that he is in agreement with my approach. And if his public declarations often
contradict this, one should take into account the specifics of the political equation and the
emotional aspects, especially the latter. They speak about this topic with tears in their
eyes.
(IOI, focusing on the same frame as Bush, Gorbachev wants to find common
ground and talks about the components the USSR favors.) Gorbachev: I would like to
stress that we view positively the change that created these possibilities for normal
contacts, broader cooperation and trade between the two German states.
(DHV, compares Gorbachev to allies, this is a subtle DHV because Bush is
implicitly rewarding Gorbachev with the same position of allies for his cooperation
thus far. He calibrates by inviting caution and further takes a stab at his domestic
opponents all in the same motion.) Bush: As strange as it may seem, on this issue you
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are in the same boat with our NATO allies. Most of the conservative ones among them welcome
your approach. At the same time they have to think beyond the time when notions of the FRG
and the GDR are history. I would tread cautiously on this issue. If our Democrats criticize my
timidity, let them do it. I do not intend to jump up onto the Wall because too much is at stake on
this issue.
(IOI, DHV – accepting Bush’s DHV and responding with humor indicates
intelligence, wit.) Gorbachev: Well, jumping on the Wall is not a good activity for a president
(Laughter).
(IOI, linking the interests of the two in common, rapport building with what is
essentially a compliment.) Bush: If Bush and Gorbachev can express satisfaction about the
changes, it will be great. But I will not be tempted to take actions that, while they might look
attractive, could lead to dangerous consequences.
(IOI, accepts this frame with compliance.) Gorbachev: Correct. The times we live in
are not only promising, but also demanding.
(CT, invites further discussion.) Bush: I hope we will have another chance, today or
tomorrow, to speak in confidence on one or two other issues.
(passive IOD, sensing an opportunity to congruence test, Gorbachev talks about a
difficult issue.) Gorbachev: I have one such issue. It is Afghanistan. Today you skillfully dodged
it. At another time I said to your predecessor that Afghanistan is a testing ground that will show
whether our two countries can resolve even the most difficult issues. I believe we should discuss
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it.
(reframing, Bush skillfully avoid the accusation frame and instead tackles the
issue head on a surplus of face value – DHV. CT, next Bush retorts with an issue of
similar value to Gorbachev inviting him to mutual cooperation on both.) Bush: I
would say that today this issue is more important for you, not for us. I must admit that
some time ago I was wrong in my forecast of what would happen after the pullout of your
troops. I am ready to discuss this issue.
From my side I would suggest discussing one issue concerning the domestic
affairs of the USSR. It could be discussed at the plenary meeting or in a one-on-one
conversation. And, if you object, we may not discuss it at all. But I would like to have the
clearest understanding of your approach to the Baltics. No mistakes should be made
there. I believe it would be preferable to talk about this issue confidentially, since I
would very much like to understand the essence of your thinking on this extremely
complicated issue.
(compliance, conclusion, accepts Bush’s frame.) Gorbachev: We shall discuss
this issue.
---------------------------------------Second Plenary session.
Third meeting between Gorbachev and Bush (Plenary Session), December 3, 1989.
(IOI, indicates willingness to engage or sustain in communication based on
previous interaction. CT by wanting to start talks first.) Gorbachev: ... I will start off
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by saying that we are pleased with the work that was done yesterday, but I believe there is a
possibility for advancing even further. If you do not object, I would like to start first.
Nevertheless, today I am your guest ...
(IOI, thanking the Soviets for their hospitality, dodging Gorbachev’s CT by not
directly responding to it.DHV) Bush: I like “my ship” very much. Seriously, we would like to
express deep gratitude for the excellent opportunity extended to our delegation to work on the
Soviet liner. Although the press is putting pressure on me right now, bombarding me with
questions about our shortening the talks yesterday, I believe the changes in the program affected
the content of our discussion substantially. For my part, I consider our discussion to have been
very good and productive. Actually, we essentially continued the talks at breakfast.
(IOI agreement with depth of rapport highlighted by the length of the discussion,
CT inviting Bush to a joint press conference as a show of good faith.) Gorbachev: Yes, we
have made a calculation and it turns out that the discussions lasted over five hours. Before we
begin discussing fundamental issues, I want to make one suggestion to you of an organizational
nature. Why don't we hold a joint press conference? I think that there would be great positive
symbolism in this.
(calibrated IOI, willingness to work with Gorbachev but constrained by system level
– i.e. responsibility to the people.) Bush: That is a good idea. In principle I agree. Only I am
afraid that our American journalists might think that I am avoiding their questions, since I did
not agree to a separate press conference. Maybe we can arrange a press conference in several

109

parts. First we will speak to the journalists together, and then I will answer questions on
my own.
(IOI, constraint understood and mirrored.) Gorbachev: I also planned to meet
with Soviet television after our joint press conference. So that is fine with me.
(IOI) Bush: Excellent. So it is decided.
(CT, here Gorbachev launches into a series of calibrations designed to see
how much more the two can accomplish. At this point the CT appears to be a soft
pitch because of intermittent calibrated IOIs prefacing it but body language would
be useful to determine that.) Gorbachev: Mr. President, yesterday I responded very
briefly to the views you expressed on the military- political questions. Today it is our
turn. I assume that our positions in this area are of great interest to you as well. I am
revising my statement to take into account yesterday’s exchange of opinions.
Even though this is only an informal meeting, we are meeting like this for the first
time, and I would like to begin with a few statements on matters of principle.
First and foremost, the new U.S. president must know that the Soviet Union will
not under any circumstances initiate a war. This is so important that I wanted to repeat
the announcement to you personally. Moreover, the USSR is prepared to cease
considering the U.S. as an enemy and announce this openly. We are open to cooperation
with America, including cooperation in the military sphere. That is the first thing.
Secondly. We support joint efforts for providing mutual security. The Soviet
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leadership is dedicated to continuing the disarmament process in all aspects. We consider it
essential and urgent to overcome the limitations of the arms race and prevent the creation of new
exotic types of weapons.
In passing, I will note that we welcome the process of cooperation that has begun
between our military leaders. In particular, we are grateful for the opportunity provided to the
Soviet minister of defense to become familiar with the U.S. armed forces.
One more thought on a matter of principle. We have adopted a defensive [military]
doctrine. We made great efforts to explain to you exactly what this was. Our armed forces are
already involved in serious reforms. The structure of the military grouping in Eastern Europe is
becoming defensive: the divisions now have fewer tanks, and they are removing ferrying
equipment. And air force deployments are changing; aviation attack forces are reverting to the
second echelon, and fighter aircraft, that is, defensive aviation forces, are moving to the front
line.
We are not making a secret of our plans for a perestroika in the armed forces. The Soviet
military is prepared at any time to meet with its American colleagues, to provide essential
information, and to discuss questions that arise.
But [new] questions also arise in return. While the Soviet Union has approved and
implemented a purely defensive doctrine, the U.S continues to be guided by a rapid reaction
strategy that was adopted over 20 years ago. That could formerly have been justified somehow.
But now, when on the military-political level it is recognized that the threats formerly emanating
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from the Warsaw Treaty no longer exist, we naturally pose the question: why is the U.S.
being so slow in enacting perestroika within its own armed forces? I have familiarized
myself with the voluminous--around 60-page--Brussels statement. And, unfortunately, I
found that there is no progress yet to be found on the part of NATO in altering its policy
at the doctrinal level in this most important area.
The next question of principle. To some degree we touched on this already when
we looked at the dynamic of the negotiating process. However, I want to return to this
problem and single out one very important point. You and I have admitted that as a result
of the arms race truly unimaginable military power arose on both sides. We have come to
the same conclusion that such a situation is fraught with catastrophe. An extremely
important negotiating process was initiated, at the forefront of which were questions
about nuclear arms reductions.
(IOI, misdirects with an off-topic compliment, evidently liking the discussion
but not wishing to answer straight on immediately.) Bush: Excuse me for interrupting
you, but I would like in this context to thank you for the deeply symbolic gift which you
sent to me through Ambassador Dobrynin--a memento made out of disassembled
missiles.
(CT, unfazed continues his CT as if the interruption did not occur, staying
within his own frame of reference. No text is italicized, more of the same as above.)
Gorbachev: Yes. The treaty on shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles became a
historic watershed. Generally speaking, the prospects that are opening up are not bad,
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and your comments yesterday convinced me that a promising basis for further progress has been
established. But what worries us? Until now, the negotiations have left out one of the three
fundamental components of military power--naval forces. Both the previous and the current
administration have reacted very emotionally whenever this question has been raised.
Meanwhile, there has been no infringement on American security. I want to announce
with full responsibility that we are taking into account the interests of the U.S. Your country is a
sea power with vitally important lines of communication conveyed via seas and oceans. Building
up naval forces is for you both a historical tradition and an entire system in science and industry
that is deeply integrated with economic interests. For that reason changing the approach here is
not so easy. We understand this well, since we ourselves are experiencing similar difficulties in
other areas of military build-up.
But what is to come of this? As early as the beginning of the 1950s we were literally
encircled by a network of military bases. They consisted of more than 500,000 people, hundreds
of fighter planes, and powerful naval forces. The U.S. has 15 aircraft carriers, approximately
1,500 fighter planes. And what immense forces are already deployed along our shores, or could
be deployed at any moment? I am not even speaking about strategic submarines--at least those
fall under the nuclear [strategic] offensive weapons negotiations. As a result of the Vienna talks,
the level of military confrontation on land will be substantially lowered.
As I have already said, there are good prospects for concluding a treaty on the reduction
of strategic offensive weapons [START]. Under these circumstances we have a right to expect
that the threat to the Soviet Union from the sea will also be diminished.
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Our ministers have already talked about this. I am taking the initiative upon
myself and am officially raising the issue of starting negotiations on the problem of naval
forces. As for how to begin them--here we are prepared to be flexible. In the beginning
let it be through measures of trust, then a general reduction in the scale of naval activity.
Then, when the situation becomes clear at the same time in Geneva and in Vienna, the
time will come to deal in earnest with the question of reducing naval forces.
I will say in advance that we will adopt a realistic position. In particular, we are
aware that the U.S. has other problems aside from Soviet military forces. But I would
still like to stress once again with total certainty: just as European security is important to
the U.S. and its allies, we are interested in the security of the seas and oceans.
Now, after delineating some of our fundamental approaches, I would like to
comment on specific negotiating points. Since we agreed in advance not to get carried
away in the details, I will, as you did yesterday, limit myself to the main issues.
I would like to make things clear between us, at least concerning three very
important negotiating positions. First, our ministers and military leaders have clarified
the interconnection between the future treaty on strategic offensive weapons and the
ABM Treaty. Second, we consider it of utmost importance--and the initiative of E.A.
Shevardnadze in Wyoming is evidence of this--to come to an agreement on the rules of
accounting for heavy bombers and strategic air-launched cruise missiles. If we take the
current American formula, then the U.S. can claim as a result not 6,000 but around 8,500
warheads. We are not trying to bargain here; as a starting point we must simply accept the
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facts of the matter. The third problem, which I already touched upon, are the strategic sealaunched cruise missiles.
There are, of course, other questions, but I am not going to speak about them now. If I
understood the president correctly, we are setting for ourselves a common frame of reference, at
least to resolve all remaining major questions by the time of the summit meeting in Washington,
and to sign the START treaty itself by the end of next year.
One more important point. I understand that this point was “pushed” by Akhromeyev and
Scowcroft. The USSR and U.S. navies have nuclear weapons, both strategic (submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles) and tactical (short-range sealaunched cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and mines). The subject of the Geneva negotiations
is the strategic nuclear component of the navy. We are left with tactical nuclear weapons. We
propose that they be destroyed. For the moment this is an unofficial conversation, but I am
making a proposal to begin official discussions. The Soviet Union is prepared to completely
destroy the navy's tactical nuclear weapons on a mutual basis. Such a radical decision would
immediately simplify the procedures for monitoring its implementation as well.
Now a few words about Vienna. On the whole I agree with the president’s evaluation of
the negotiations. However, even here three important problems remain. The first is the question
of reducing not only arms but also military personnel. We proposed a reduction to 1,300,000 on
each side, that is, by one million on each side. NATO representatives do not agree with this, but
for some reason they do not name their own figures. I think that people will simply not
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understand us if we limit ourselves only to a reduction in weapons [when] groupings that
are enormous in strength face each other in Europe.
The second issue relates to troop reductions on foreign territory. We propose
limiting them to a ceiling of 300,000, but we are being drawn in another direction—to the
reduction of only Soviet and American troops. But there are also English, French,
Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian troops. In short, we are being offered an unfair solution.
Now on the problem of air forces. We have proposed for each alliance a level of 4,700
tactical theater aviation aircraft and a separate level for interceptor aircraft. But so far
things here have also been progressing slowly. We suggest that special attention be paid
to this issue at the next ministers’ meeting.
Briefly, about the president’s proposal on “open skies.” We support it. We will
participate in the Ottawa conference. We are ready for productive joint work with the
U.S. As it seems to us, there are substantial reserves in this proposal. Let us have our
ministers and military
specialists discuss expanding the open status of the oceans and seas, space and land.

... To summarize what I have said, I wish to stress once again most strongly that
we are disposed toward peaceful relations with the U.S. And based on that premise, we
propose to transform the current military confrontation. That is what is most important.
[....]
(CT, posing a question to shift the direction of dialogue.) Gorbachev: Perhaps
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we should now end the discussion of military issues and talk about Europe, and reflect on how to
react to the efforts regarding developing cooperation there?
(IOI, agreeing with Gorbachev and hinting to all subordinates present to also
comply with the cooperative spirit.) Bush: That is an excellent idea. But allow me to add a few
words. I am very pleased with the cooperation between our diplomatic departments, in military
as well as in other areas. I believe that the channels for discussing military-political problems are
now integrally supplementing the contacts initiated by Akhromeyev and [Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Adm. William] Crowe. Meetings between military specialists help matters
greatly, and I hope that we will continue to develop this practice.
(IOI, answering in the affirmative, sets the tone for his subordinates to follow.)
Gorbachev: That is exactly what we intend to do.
(IOI, furthering the cooperation by asking allies for accountability and
transparency.) Bush: I will say frankly that our military has immense influence in NATO. I
have just asked them to do an analysis of military expenditures in the U.S. and the West
combined, and to present their recommendations. I think that in this crucial period, contacts
between our military leaders are particularly significant.
(IOI agreeing with the plan, CT, asking Bush to lead the discussion in the frame
Gorbachev set forth.) Gorbachev: So we will have them meet more often. Would you like to go
first in discussing European issues?
(IOD, it is unclear because there is no body language or tone to reference why this is
an IOD but based on Gorbachev’s response it was taken as an IOD because it suggests that
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Europe is somehow more valuable to the USSR than the US. CT, Bush awaits
Gorbachev’s thoughts on the matter and calibrates it with interest in his response.
The shift from a rather harsh response to a softer one is likely due to shifts in body
language.) Bush: You are closer to Europe, but I would like to preface our conversation
with a few comments.
First of all, I admit that we were shocked by the swiftness of the changes that
unfolded. We regard highly your personal reaction and the reaction of the Soviet Union
as a whole to these dynamic, and at the same time fundamental, changes.
Although we did not go into details, during yesterday's conversation we discussed
eye-to-eye the problem of the reunification of Germany. I hope that you understand that
you cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification. At the same time, we
realize the extent to which this is a delicate, sensitive issue. We are trying to act with a
certain reserve. I will phrase this thought a little differently: there is no desire on my
part, nor among the representatives of my administration, to be in a position that would
appear provocative. I emphasize that point. Another example of our policy with respect
to Eastern Europe: we sent a high-level delegation to Poland. It included my senior
economic advisers, other representatives of the administration, businesspeople, union
leaders, etc. They went there not to create difficulties but to explain to the Poles what
mechanisms, in our opinion, are effective in the economic sphere. I will not elaborate on
each Eastern European country but will stress the thought that we understand very well
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the meaning of the section of the Helsinki Act governing national boundaries in Europe.
It stands to reason that I am ready to answer any of your questions. Personally, I am most
interested in how you view the possibility of moving beyond the limits of the status quo.
(IOD, disacknowledgment of the frame, letting Bush know he fully disagrees and
rejects his previous statement.) Gorbachev: I do not agree that we are “closer to Europe.” The
USSR and the U.S. are equally integrated into European problems. We understand very well
your involvement in Europe. To look at the role of the U.S. in the Old World any differently is
unrealistic, erroneous, and ultimately unconstructive. You must know this; it is our basic
position.
(DHV 30) Bush: That is not exactly what I meant. I just meant that historically we were
not as close to Eastern Europe. Of course we are close--and will be close--to Europe; we are
vitally interested and involved in NATO. The U.S. is, properly speaking, the leader of NATO. I
want to emphasize apart from this that you are catalyzing changes in Europe in a constructive
way.
(IOI into a CT 31) Gorbachev: I reaffirmed our fundamental position on the U.S.’ role in
Europe for a reason. There is too much speculation on this issue. It is aimed both at you and us.
We should be absolutely clear on such important matters.
Now, on the changes in Europe. They are truly fundamental in nature. And not only in
Eastern Europe--in Western Europe, too. I received representatives from the Trilateral
30

This is more complex DHV, Here Bush reframes by stacking forward. This refers to a move to escape a
disadvantageous conversation thread by switching gears to make the frame the topic in a more advantageous way.
31
Gorbachev is calling for equal partnership and leadership instead of seizing advantage.
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Commission. After one of the conversations, Giscard d’Estaing, who was the speaker,
addressed me and said in a very meaningful way: “Be ready to deal with a united federal
state of Western Europe.” By saying that, I think, he meant that when European
integration reaches a qualitatively new level in 1992 it will be accompanied by a deep
reorganization of political structures that will reach the federal level as well.
Therefore, all of Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of
something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, and we associate this movement
with the idea of a common European home. I would like to ask E.A. Shevardnadze and
Secretary of State Baker to discuss this idea in more depth, because I think it is in the
interests of both the USSR and the U.S.
We should act--and interact--in a particularly responsible and balanced way
during this period when all of Europe is undergoing such dynamic changes.
(IOI) Bush: I agree with you.
(IOI, elaborating on specifics but agreeing with the general concept set forth
by Bush.) Gorbachev: After all, as the saying goes, every five years a gun goes off by
itself. The fewer weapons, the less chance for an accidental catastrophe. In the process,
the security of the U.S. and its allies should not be less by even one millimeter than our
own security.
(DHV 32) Shevardnadze: Yesterday the president introduced an interesting
proposal on chemical weapons. The secretary of state and I discussed this issue in great
32

Shevardnadze is making Gorbachev look good by preparing the way for the leaders’ ideas.
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detail and very constructively. As is apparent, it deserves the strictest attention.
(CT, while this seems like a simple factual statement, it is actually guiding the
discussion topic so by explicitly stating the two areas where Gorbachev and Bush agree,
Gorbachev wants Bush to continue along those lines.)
Gorbachev: I have already stated my first reaction.
As I understand it, there are two areas in which we agree. As a common goal we have
before us a global prohibition on chemical weapons, but we are moving in stages and in so doing
are rejecting the modernization of binary weapons. This is a good basis for negotiations.
(IOI, compliance. Bush follows the agenda as set in Gorbachev’s previous
statement.) Bush: If you will allow me, I would like in this connection to raise the very critical
question of the proliferation of chemical weapons outside our two countries. In particular we are
concerned about Libya. I, of course, understand that you are not in a position to control the
Libyan leader. However, we, as before, are convinced that the factory in Rabta is designated to
produce chemical weapons. We would like to work with you not only on this specific problem,
but on the whole issue of preventing the spread of chemical weapons, which are still sometimes
called the “poor man's atom bomb.” The whole world has already seen the horrible consequences
of the spread of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Therefore, we propose reaching
an agreement in this area, too. Personally, this issue worries me greatly.
(IOI, Gorbachev agrees with Bush’s statements.) Gorbachev: I want to assure you that
our positions on this issue coincide. The Soviet Union is decisively against the spread of
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chemical weapons. I suggest that our ministers continue their discussion of this problem
on the basis of directives set by us.
(CT, invites the Soviet leader to work together to eliminate chemical WMD.)
Bush: We must make immediate progress in this area. For now, you and I are morally
vulnerable. Others do not want to move, or they are moving in the opposite direction,
alleging that Soviet and American chemical arsenals will remain untouched.
(IOI, compliance.) Gorbachev: I am convinced that even here we can work
together successfully. If the USSR and the U.S. begin to reduce their chemical arsenals
gradually, we will have the moral right to argue even more strongly for nonproliferation
of chemical weapons ...
(IOI, agreement) Bush: I fully agree with these views.
(CT, the main thrust of this test is to make Bush withdraw the concept of the
U.S. advancing Western values in the East because that implies that all this good
change is a result of the West’s leadership. Gorbachev wants co-leadership, not a
dominant leader. The compliance change involves altering the message slightly and
shifting the focus from unipolar to multipolar.) Gorbachev: When I meet with political
leaders from Eastern as well as Western Europe, I tell them all that this is an objective
process that brings together countries across the continent. They are now looking for
optimal variants for combining economics, technology, and various standards ...
What is the essence of this essentially consensus- based approach? We are
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convinced that we must work toward continuing and developing the Helsinki process, and by no
means toward destroying what was created on the basis of it. After this, Helsinki II will be
needed so that we can interpret the new situation and work out joint criteria and frameworks. It is
understood that all the countries that signed the Helsinki Act, including of course the U.S. and
Canada, must take part in this meeting. Another important question: What to do with institutions
created in another age? This also demands a balanced and responsible approach. Otherwise the
current positive direction of the process of change might turn into its opposite, and lead to the
undermining of stability. Existing instruments for supporting the balance must not be shattered
but modified in accordance with the demands of the age. They must be utilized to strengthen
security and stability and improve relations between states. Let NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization become to an even greater degree political, not just military, organizations; and let
there be a change in their confrontational nature. It is good that our generals have already begun
to grasp the spirit of the times, to visit each other, and to discuss the most complex questions.
I am certain that there are good prospects for cooperation in the CMEA. In the CMEA we
are planning complex measures to ease entry into the structure of the world economy.
Our members of parliament are already cooperating--and are not doing a bad job: a
“people’s diplomacy” is developing. Such a comprehensive, positive atmosphere will protect all
of us from unexpected and unpleasant surprises in the future.
I am under the impression that U.S. leaders are now quite actively advancing the idea of
conquering the division of Europe on the basis of “Western values.” If this premise is not solely
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for propaganda purposes, and they are intending to make it a basis for practical policy,
then I will say bluntly that they are committing many follies. At one time in the West
there was anxiety that the Soviet Union was planning to export revolution. But the aim of
exporting “Western values” sounds similar.
I would put it this way: The times are now very complex and therefore
particularly crucial. The fact that Eastern Europe is changing in the direction of greater
openness, democracy, and rapprochement toward general human values, and creating
mechanisms for compatibility and world economic progress, all this opens unprecedented
possibilities for stepping up to a new level of relations; a step utilizing peaceful, calm
means. Here it is very dangerous to force artificially or to push the processes taking
place, all the more so for the purpose of satisfying certain unilateral interests.
The possibilities for European integration in the cultural and political spheres can
be most varied, including those never before experienced. This will not take place
painlessly. In some locations the situation will even become critical. And this is natural,
for there are immense and varied social forces being drawn into the events.
I can make this judgment at least about the Soviet Union. Our country is a
genuine conglomerate of peoples. They have various traditions and historical features of
development. We are now fiercely discussing the future of the Soviet economy, or, for
example, the question of what kinds of political institutions are needed under conditions
of serious democratization. The task of transforming our federation has once again
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become critical. Recently I exchanged views on this issue with the Canadian prime minister. He
is worried about Quebec, which for many years has been pursuing separatist goals. By the way,
even at that time the thought occurred to me: why is the American Congress involved in the
Baltic region and not in helping the Canadians resolve the Quebec problem?
Our own experience allows us to predict that the processes in Europe will not always go
smoothly. In general, this has already been confirmed. But on the whole we are looking at
things optimistically. When you think on the level of a simple reaction to events, it can make you
shiver; some people might even begin to panic. But if you rise to the political, philosophical
level, then everything falls into place. After all, if the nature of the process is a deep one, if it
broaches fundamental matters involving millions of people, whole nationalities, then how can it
flow smoothly and easily? It is essential to proceed from an understanding of the immense
importance of current changes. We must avoid any possible mistake and utilize the historical
possibilities opening up for a rapprochement between East and West. Of course, differences will
remain. We discussed that yesterday. Even in the Soviet Union--in one state--differences
between republics and different regions are visible to the naked eye. I am certain that such
differences exist in the U.S. as well. Even more so, they must be present on the vast European
continent.
We are in favor of having a common understanding with the U.S. of the events taking
place in our country. I have ascertained that today such a common understanding exists. But the
process will continue to develop. And I want this understanding not to weaken but, on the
contrary, to become even stronger.
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I want us to cooperate continually on the basis of this understanding throughout
this complex transitional period. Otherwise the process might fall apart, and we will all
end up in a chaotic state, which will create a multitude of problems, will bring a halt to
the changes, and will throw us back to an age of suspicion and mistrust. I emphasize:
great responsibility lies with the Soviet Union and the U.S. at this historic moment.
(IOD, Bush resists changing the message, saying that Western values are
compatible with the changes but this does not imply co-leadership.) Bush: I want to
clarify one point. You expressed concern about Western values. This would be
understandable if our adherence to certain ideals caused difficulties in the USSR or in
Eastern Europe, if it disturbed the progressive processes developing there. But we have
never pursued such goals. Any discussion of Western values in NATO or in other Western
organizations is completely natural and does not have a destructive purpose. After all,
what are Western values? They are, if you will, free speech, openness, lively debates. In
the economic realm-- stimulus for progress, a free market. These values are not
something new or of the moment; we have shared them for a long time with the Western
Europeans; they unite the West. We welcome changes in the Soviet Union or in Poland,
but by no means set them against Western values. So I want as best as possible to
understand your point of view in order to avoid any misunderstanding.
(CT, Gorbachev tries another approach insisting that each sovereign is free
to choose whatever model the people want. This still aims to shift power from the
unipolar to the multipolar.) Gorbachev: The main principle which we have adopted and
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which we are following in the framework of the new way of thinking is the right of each country
to a free election, including the right to reexamine or change its original choice. This is very
painful, but it is a fundamental right: the right to elect from within without interference. The
U.S. adheres to a certain social and economic system, which the American people chose. So let
other people decide for themselves which God, figuratively speaking, to worship.
For me it is important that the tendency toward renewal that has taken shape in Eastern
and Western Europe is moving in the direction of rapprochement. The result will not be a copy of
the Swedish, English or Soviet model. No. Something will turn out that will meet the demands
of the current stage of development in human and European civilization.
I have just discovered that people have no fear of choosing between one system and
another. They are searching for their own unique possibility, one that will provide them with the
best standard of living. When this search flows freely, then there is only one thing left to say:
good luck.
(Reframing, Bush still avoids tackling the unipolar/multipolar angle but promises a
non-intrusive approach to global governance.) Bush: I do not think that we differ on this. We
approve of self-determination and the debates that go along with it. I want you to interpret our
approach in a positive light: Western values by no means signify the intrusion of our system on
Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the GDR.
(CT, still emphasizing a multipolar approach in the spirit of cooperation and
inviting Bush to accept this frame of reference because implying Western values guide
progress makes it seem as though the Soviets were wrong and coming around to Western
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thought.) Gorbachev: That is very important for us. Fundamental changes are
happening, people are coming together. That is the most important thing. I see that on
East European soil, ways of resolving problems that involve a different system--in the
fields of economics, technology, etc.--are becoming established. That is natural. If we
share a common understanding, then all our practical actions undertaken under changing
conditions will be appropriate and will come to acquire a positive character.
(IOD, insists that Western values are the source of free choice) Baker: I would
like to clarify our approach to self-determination. We agree that each country must have
the right to free elections. But all this makes sense only when the people in the country
are really in a position to choose freely. This also falls under the concept of “Western
values,” and by no means is it a right to thrust one’s ways upon others.
(IOD to Baker, disaffirming, Western values are not infallible and cannot be
the sole meter of progress versus regression.) Gorbachev: If someone is making a
claim to the ultimate truth, they can expect disaster.
(IOI to Gorbachev, Bush understands the frame of reference.) Bush:
Absolutely right.
(reframing, attempts to lead Gorbachev on a tangent emotional issue.) Baker:
That is not exactly what I meant. Take, for example, the question of reunification of
Germany, which is making both you and us nervous, as well as many Europeans. What
are we advocating there? For reunification to happen based on the principles of openness,
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pluralism, and a free market. By no means do we want the reunification of Germany to
reproduce the model of 1937-1945, which, evidently, is something that worries you. Germany of
that time had nothing in common with Western values.
(IOD, stays in the current frame, further focusing the question.) Gorbachev: A.N.
Yakovlev is asking: Why are democracy, openness, [free] market “Western values?”
(reframing, CT implying that both are in the same camp so who cares how they got
there.) Bush: It was not always that way. You personally created a start for these changes
directed toward democracy and openness. Today it is really much clearer than it was, say, 20
years ago that we share these values with you.
(IOD, clearly unhappy his frame is being rejected.) Gorbachev: There is no point in
entering into propaganda battles.
(IOD, assists Gorbachev by reframing the issue.) Yakovlev: When you insist on
“Western values,” then “Eastern values” unavoidably appear, and “Southern values”

...
(IOD, reinforced by Yakovlev holds to his new frame.) Gorbachev: Exactly, and when
that happens, ideological confrontations flare up again.
(accepts the frame partially without explicitly restating the origin of the values, CT
to Gorbachev and Yakovlev accept a partially favorable reply and retain face value with a
partial win.) Bush: I understand and I agree. Let us try to avoid careless words and talk more
about the content of these values. From the bottom of our hearts we welcome the changes that
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are taking place.
(IOI, accepts that the partial concession understanding that continuing this
thread will only lead to more division, saving face.) Gorbachev: That is very
important. You see, as I said, the most important thing is that the changes lead to greater
openness even in our relations with each other. We are beginning to become organically
integrated, freeing ourselves from everything that divided us. What will this be called in
the final analysis? I think it is a new level of relations. For that reason, for my part, I
support your proposal; let us not conduct the discussion at the level of the Church. In
history this has always led to religious wars.
(DLV, not recognizing the shift in face and attempting to compromise where
no validation was needed.) Baker: Maybe, by way of compromise, we will say that this
positive process is happening on the basis of “democratic values?”...
(IOD, completely ignoring Baker’s conversational thread.) Gorbachev: There
are two realities in Afghanistan—the opposition and Najibullah. Let us try to help this
interaction between them. How they will come to an agreement—is their business. The
Soviet Union will accept any decision. Najibullah is ready for such an open dialog, and
one should not present ultimatums, demands for his departure. Who would remove him?
Or should we send our troops there again?
(CT, responding to Gorbachev’s frame with a direct compliance test, a
command really.) Baker: Stop your massive assistance to Kabul.
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(IOD, completely disacknowledges Baker’s CT) Gorbachev: Leave this empty talk
behind. Do not assume that you know everything. You predicted Najibullah’s demise after the
Soviet troop withdrawal so many times already.
They have such a difficult situation there that primitive solutions simply do not exist.
(CT, inviting Gorbachev to expand on this new information.) Bush: Frankly
speaking, I am surprised by your information that tribal leaders are ready to talk to Najibullah.
(IOI, gives more information., CT – telling Bush to ask Hekmatyar.) Gorbachev: Not
just ready, they are already talking with him one by one. Ask Hekmatyar, for example.
(IOD, disacknowledges frame.) Bush: We do not have any contact with him.
(IOD, rebuffs Bush) Shevardnadze: But the CIA does.
(DHV, attempts to reframe and put the discussion back on track.) Scowcroft: We are
not trying to prevent contacts between the mujahedeen and Najibullah.
(CT, provides a way for Bush to save face.) Gorbachev: We ourselves probably know
only about a small portion of such contacts. The East is the East.
(IOI, compliance) Bush: I completely agree with you.
(IOI, exit strategy on a positive note.) Gorbachev: Let our ministers continue this
useful conversation.
(DHV, CT provides a possible solution to the situation and offers Gorbachev the
chance to accept.) Baker: We need the mujahedeen agreement to the idea of a “transitional
period.” Before, the opposition did not want to have any contacts with Najibullah. Now they are
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sending us signals that they are ready to start negotiations about a period of transition at
one table with Najibullah. But only on the condition that from the very beginning, there
will be a clear understanding that in the end of the period of transition Najibullah would
retire and a new government would be formed. Here, the participation of the UN might
be useful, including organizing an international conference. The American delegation in
Wyoming was negotiating from precisely these positions.
(IOI, acceptance) Gorbachev: We can discuss your ideas.
(CT, presses his advantage and tries to get more concessions.) Baker: If the
mujahedeen agree, then elements of the PDPA could be included in the next government,
but with a clear understanding that Najibullah and his close allies would not be a part of
it.
(IOD, rebuffs Baker’s request.) Shevardnadze: Let them decide this themselves.
(IOI to Shevardnadze, accepts Shevardnadze’s approach.) Gorbachev: The
dialog itself will clarify this issue. The idea of a transition period is quite reasonable,
because it allows the two realities to interact. If the Afghans themselves decide that
Najibullah must leave—God help them. This is their business. Nobody is imposing him
on them.
(IOI to Soviets, accepts Shevardnadze’s approach.) Bush: This would be good.
(IOD, attempts to rebuff Shevardnadze’s approach.) Baker: But the
mujahedeen will simply not sit at the negotiating table if they are not convinced
beforehand that in the end of the transition period there would be a new head of
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government in Afghanistan.
(IOD, reaffirms Shevardnadze’s approach.) Gorbachev: And who would give them
such a guarantee? If they are so confident that their positions prevail, why worry about it?
(IOD, again attempts to rebuff Shevardnadze’s approach.) Baker: A new element just
emerged. The opposition is at last ready to talk with Najibullah about the conditions of forming a
new government. But they have to be confident that in the interests of peace Najibullah would
step down in the end.
---------------------------------End.
Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit. (1989, December 2-3). Archive of the Gorbachev
Foundation. Translated by Vladislav Zubok and Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security
Archive.] Retrieved from
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf
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APPENDIX B: PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE IN RICHMOND VA 1992
TRANSCRIPT
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Excerpt from the Second Presidential Debate in Richmond, Virginia on Nov. 15, 1992
From the Archives of the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum
[…]
(N/A 33) Ms. Simpson: We have a question right here.
(IOD, CT, the audience member asks the politicians to follow her frame of reference and
implies in her question that if they have not been affected by the national debt they cannot
be a part of the solution. This is a false disqualifier, it assumes one must have experience
with debt in order to know how to get out of it.) Audience Participant: Yes, how has the
national debt personally affected each of your lives? And if it hasn't, how can you honestly find a
cure for the economic problems of the common people if you have no experience in what's ailing
them?
(compliance, DLV, asks for permission instead of answering directly which connotes
dominance and leadership. As the President, one should be decisive instead of deferring.)
Mr. Perot: May I answer it?
(N/A) Ms. Simpson: Well, Mr. Perot, yes, of course.
(DLV, instead of taking the leadership role, he defers) Mr. Perot: Who do you want to start
with?
(CT, continues with the same frame of reference.) Audience Participant: My question is for
each of you, so -- --
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N/A where the moderator is facilitating order and communication.
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(DLV validation seeking, Perot says all the right things which appear to connote the
correct values, but it rings hollow because he tries too hard by effectively telling the
audience member how awesome and self-sacrificing he is.) Mr. Perot: Yes, it caused me to
disrupt my private life and my business to get involved in this activity. That's how much I care
about it. Believe me, if you knew my family and if you knew the private life I have, you would
agree in a minute that that's a whole lot more fun than getting involved in politics.
I have lived the American dream. I came from a very modest background. Nobody's been
luckier than I've been, all the way across the spectrum, and the greatest riches of all are my wife
and children. It's true of any family. But I want all the children, I want these young people up
here to be able to start with nothing but an idea like I did and build a business. But they've got to
have a strong basic economy. And if you're in debt, it's like having a ball and chain around you.
I just figure as lucky as I've been, I owe it to them, and I owe it to the future generations. And on
a very personal basis, I owe it to my children and grandchildren.
(N/A) Ms. Simpson: Thank you, Mr. Perot.
Mr. President.
(reframing, attempts to misdirect away from the question.) President Bush: Well, I think the
national debt affects everybody. Obviously, it has a lot to do with interest rates -- -(IOD, interrupts to stop reframing) Ms. Simpson: [interrupt] She's saying you personally.
(IOD, interrupts to stop reframing) Audience Participant: [interrupt] You, on a personal basis,
how has it affected you?
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(IOD, interrupts to stop reframing) Ms. Simpson: [interrupt] Has it affected you personally?
(DLV qualifying behavior, attempting to reframe and show value but with nonverbal body
language indicating discomfort.) President Bush: Well, I'm sure it has. I love my
grandchildren. I want to think that -- -(IOD, interrupts to stop reframing) Audience Participant: [interrupt] How?
[microexpression, President Bush lifts his eyebrows up in uncertainty, disbelief, surprise,
or exasperation IOD/DLV]
(DLV, staying in this bad frame without a way out while expressing clear discomfort.)
President Bush: I want to think that they're going to be able to afford an education. I think that
that's an important part of being a parent. If the question -- maybe I get it wrong. Are you
suggesting that if somebody has means that the national debt doesn't affect them?
[nonverbally President Bush looks at his watch and points his finger at the Audience
Participant while answering and turns away from her while answering. Bush’s eye contact
is sporadic, weak, drifting, and random. He shows clear discomfort with the question,
jerky hand motions, and a forced curt tone. Nonverbal behavior perfectly congruent with
the verbal discomfort with the question.]
(N/A) Audience Participant: What I'm saying -- -(CT, tries to get the Audience Participant to offer a face saving change of frame.) President
Bush: [interrupts] I'm not sure I get it. Help me with the question, and I'll try to answer it.
(IOD, continues the same frame.) Audience Participant: Well, I've had friends that have been
laid off in jobs -- -137

(DLV) President Bush: [interrupts] Yes. [The President approaches the speaker in an
attempt and both intimidation and to offset the fact that he’s visibly off-balanced by the
question. In terms of personal space, he is unsure of how close he should stand; he walks
closer to her, then backs off, visibly uncomfortable.]
(IOD, CT, presents the President the exact same frame as offered before with the false
disqualifier intact.) Audience Participant: I know people who cannot afford to pay the mortgage
on their homes, their car payment. I have personal problems with the national debt. But how has
it affected you? And if you have no experience in it, how can you help us if you don't know what
we're feeling?
(N/A) Ms. Simpson: I think she means more the recession, the economic problems today the
country faces rather than -- -(major DLV, makes self-aggrandizing statements.) President Bush: Well, listen, you ought to
be in the White House for a day and hear what I hear and see what I see and read the mail I read
and touch the people that I touch from time to time.
I was in the Lomax AME Church. It's a black church just outside of Washington, DC,
and I read in the bulletin about teenage pregnancies, about the difficulty that families are having
to make ends meet. I talked to parents. I mean, you've got to care. Everybody cares if people
aren't doing well. But I don't think it's fair to say you haven't had cancer, therefore you don't
know what it's like. I don't think it's fair to say, whatever it is, if you haven't been hit by it
personally. But everybody's affected by the debt, because of the tremendous interest that goes
into paying on that debt, everything's more expensive. Everything comes out of your pocket and
138

my pocket. So it's that. But I think in terms of the recession, of course, you feel it when you're
President of the United States. That's why I'm trying to do something about it by stimulating the
export, investing more, better education system.
Thank you. I'm glad you clarified it.
(CT, invites the Audience Participant to comply with his new frame of reference where the
false disqualifier is dropped.) Governor Clinton: Tell me how it's affected you again? You
know people who have lost their jobs and lost their homes?
(IOI, she complies not realizing this.) Audience Participant: Yes.
(DHV with complete reframing while avoiding the false disqualifier. 34) Governor Clinton:
Well, I've been Governor of a small State for 12 years. I'll tell you how it's affected me. Every
year, Congress and the President sign laws that make us do more things; it gives us less money
to do it with. I see people in my State, middle class people, their taxes have gone up from
Washington and their services have gone down, while the wealthy have gotten tax cuts.
I have seen what's happened in this last 4 years when, in my State, when people lose their
jobs there's a good chance I'll know them by their names. When a factory closes, I know the
people who ran it. When the businesses go bankrupt, I know them. And I've been out here for 13
months, meeting in meetings just like this ever since October with people like you all over
America, people that have lost their jobs, lost their livelihood, lost their health insurance.
34

Clinton tells the audience participant what she wants to hear without actually answering the question because his
nonverbal behavior is smoother and he pulls her into his frame of reference. He offers the same platitudes as Bush
but the delivery shows that he owns his space. Clinton’s eye contact is distinct, unwavering, and calm. The effect is
palpable while President Bush’s gaping jaw and reactive behavior in the background further accents this win for
Clinton.
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What I want you to understand is, the national debt is not the only cause of that. It is because
America has not invested in its people. It is because we have not grown. It is because we've had
12 years of trickle-down economics. We've gone from 1st to 12th in the world in wages. We've
had 4 years where we've produced no private sector jobs. Most people are working harder for
less money than they were making 10 years ago. It is because we are in the grip of a failed
economic theory. And this decision you're about to make better be about what kind of economic
theory you want, not just people saying, “I want to go fix it,” but what are we going to do.
What I think we have to do is invest in American jobs, in American education, control American
health care costs, and bring the American people together again.
(IOI, acceptance) Ms. Simpson: Thank you, Governor Clinton We are a little more than
halfway through this program, and I'm glad that we're getting the diversity of questions that we
are.
Presidential Debate in Richmond, Virginia. (1992, October 15). George Bush Presidential
Library and Museum. Retrieved from
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=4959&year=1992&month=all
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=7ffbFvKlWqE
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APPENDIX C: PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY SOUTH CAROLINA 2012
TRANSCRIPT
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South Carolina GOP CNN debate, Jan. 19, 2012. Transcript
transcript courtesy Federal News Service
(CT, setting up the rules of engagement for the candidates and inviting them to comply.)
JOHN KING: I want to ask the candidates to get comfortable at their podiums, have our
audience take their seats while I tell you a bit about how tonight's debate will work. I'll
ask questions, as will some members of our audience tonight. I'll follow up and guide the
discussion.
Candidates, I promise you, we're going to try to make sure each of you gets your fair
share of the time and the questions. You'll have one minute to answer and 30 seconds for
follow-ups and rebuttals, and I'll make sure you get time to respond if you are singled out
for criticism.
Now let's have the candidates introduce themselves. We're going to ask them to keep it
short, and here's an example. I'm John King from CNN. I'm rooting for the Patriots this
weekend -- (cheers) -- and I'm honored to be your moderator this evening.
Senator Santorum, let's begin with you.
(IOI, friendly greeting) RICK SANTORUM: I'm Rick Santorum, and I want to thank the
people of the Low Country for their hospitality to my wife, Karen, and our seven Children. And
I also want to thank the people of Iowa for a little delayed but most welcome victory there.
Thank you to the people of Iowa. (Cheers, applause.)
(N/A) MR. KING: Governor.
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(IOI friendly greeting) MITT ROMNEY: I'm Mitt Romney. It's good to be back in South
Carolina, see many good friends here. It's also great to be here with my wife and some of my
kids. I'm married now 42 years. I have five sons, five daughters-in-law, 16 grandkids, and
they're the joy of my life. Thank you. (Applause.)
(N/A) MR. KING: Mr. Speaker
(IOI friendly greeting, implied conspiracy frame mentioning the South.) NEWT
GINGRICH: I'm Newt Gingrich. I want to thank the people of South Carolina for
being so hospitable. As a Georgian, it feels good to be back at home in the South, and I look
forward to this evening. (Applause.)
(N/A) MR. KING: Congressman Paul.
(DLV, qualifying himself where it was not required instead of a friendly greeting.)
REPRESENTATIVE RON PAUL (R-TX): Thank you very much. It's great to be here tonight. I
am a congressman from Texas. I've been elected for -- 12 times. And also I practiced OB-GYN
for a 30-year period. I've also served five years in the military and I'm only -- I'm the only U.S.
veteran on this stage tonight. (Cheers, applause.)
(CT, inviting Gingrich to accept his frame of reference.) MR. KING: You've met the
candidates. It's time now to begin the debate, an even that has quite a dramatically different feel
than just a few hours ago. Just this morning, as Senator Santorum just noted, we learned he, not
Governor Romney, won the Iowa caucuses. (Cheers, applause.) There were five podiums on this
stage when the sun came up; four now because of Governor Rick Perry's decision to drop out.
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Just as Speaker Gingrich surged into contention here in South Carolina, a direct, fresh character
attack on the speaker. And Mr. Speaker, I want to start with that this evening.
As you know, your ex-wife gave an interview to ABC News and another interview with
The Washington Post, and this story has now gone viral on the Internet. In it, she says that you
came to her in 1999, at a time when you were having an affair. She says you asked her, sir, to
enter into an open marriage. Would you like to take some time to respond to that?
(IOD by rejecting the frame of reference by saying no, DHV by keeping completely cold
and calculating, without emotional reaction, and reframing by actually avoiding answering
the question to indicate a lack of compliance with the frame.) MR. GINGRICH: No -- but I
will. (Cheers, applause.) I think -- I think the destructive, vicious, negative nature of much of the
news media makes it harder to govern this country, harder to attract decent people to run for
public office. And I am appalled that you would begin a presidential debate on a topic like that.
(Cheers, applause.)
(CT, seeing if Gingrich was done at just rejecting the frame.) MR. KING: Is that all you want
to say, sir?
(IOD, disacknowledgment.) MR. GINGRICH: Let me finish.
(DLV, compliance) MR. KING: Please. (Boos, cheers, applause.)
(IOD, identifies with the audience, nonverbally and again continues to desolate and
eradicate John King’s face value.) MR. GINGRICH: Every person in here knows personal
pain. Every person in here has had someone close to them go through painful things. To take an
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ex-wife and make it two days before the primary a significant question in a presidential
campaign is as close to despicable as anything I can imagine. (Cheers, applause.)
My -- my two daughters, my two daughters wrote the head of ABC, and made the point
that it was wrong, that they should pull it. And I am frankly astounded that CNN would take
trash like that and use it to open a presidential debate. (Cheers, applause.)
(DLV, weak reframe by attempting to shift blame, ending in acceptance of the weakened
position and loss of face value as having messed up for asking the question.) MR. KING: As
you noted, Mr. Speaker, this story did not come from our network. As you also know, it is a
subject of conversation on the campaign. I'm not -- I get your point; I take get your -(IOD, further damages John King’s face value by forcing him to accept responsibility for
the indiscretion.) MR. GINGRICH: [interrupt] John, John, it was repeated by your network.
(Boos.) You chose to start the debate with it. Don't try to blame somebody else. You and your
staff chose to start this debate with that. (Cheers, applause.)
(DLV compliance, failed attempt to reframe.) MR. KING: [interrupt] Now, OK -(IOD by answering the question after having decimated the moderator’s credibility,
embedded DHV by implying that Gingrich and Romney are the only serious candidates
while the others have not drawn much fire from the media.) MR. GINGRICH: Now, let me
be quite clear. Let me be quite clear. The story is false. Every personal friend I have who knew
us in that period says the story was false. We offered several of them to ABC to prove it was
false. They weren't interested, because they would like to attack any Republican. They're
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attacking the governor, they're attacking me. I'm sure they'll probably get around to Senator
Santorum and Congressman Paul. I am tired of the elite media protecting Barack Obama by
attacking Republicans.
(Cheers, applause.) […]
South Carolina GOP CNN debate. (2012, January 19) Transcript. Retrieved from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-fU-knxT0U
Start YouTube video at 6:17, skipping the introduction.
http://2012election.procon.org/sourcefiles/Jan_19_2012_republican_debate.pdf
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Table 9: Malta Summit Coding
CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX A
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Bush: IOI, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT

Bush: IOI, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT

Bush: IOI, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT

Bush: IOI, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT

Gorbachev: unclear,
IOI/IOD

Gorbachev: unclear,
IOD

Gorbachev: unclear,
IOI/IOD

Gorbachev: unclear,
IOI/IOD

Bush: DLV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DLV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DLV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DLV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,
CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,
CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,
CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,
CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Gorbachev: DHV, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: DHV, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: DHV, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: DHV, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: N/A
Gorbachev: N/A
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: N/A
Gorbachev: N/A
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: N/A
Gorbachev: N/A
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV,
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CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX A
CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Bush: IOI, CT

Bush: IOI, CT

Bush: IOI, CT

Bush: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI partial,
IOD partial
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI partial,
IOD partial
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI partial,
IOD partial
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI partial,
IOD partial
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD

Gorbachev: IOD, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOD, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOD, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOD, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Gorbachev: IOI, DHV
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
------------------------------

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Bush: IOI, DHV

Bush: IOI, DHV

Bush: IOI, DHV

Bush: IOI, DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT

Bush: IOI, interrupt
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI

Bush: IOI, interrupt
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI

Bush: IOI, interrupt
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI

Bush: IOI, interrupt
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD
Bush: DHV

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
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CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Shevardnadze: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Bush: IOI to Gorbachev
Baker: attempted DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Shevardnadze: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Bush: IOI to Gorbachev
Baker: attempted DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Shevardnadze: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Bush: IOI to Gorbachev
Baker: attempted DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX A
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Shevardnadze: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: IOD
Gorbachev: CT
Bush: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Bush: IOI to Gorbachev
Baker: attempted DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Bush: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOD

Yakovlev: IOD, DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Bush/Baker
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: DLV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: CT
Gorbachev: strong IOD
to Baker
Bush: CT

Yakovlev: IOD, DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Bush/Baker
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: DLV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: CT
Gorbachev: strong IOD
to Baker
Bush: CT

Yakovlev: IOD, DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Bush/Baker
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: DLV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: CT
Gorbachev: strong IOD
to Baker
Bush: CT

Yakovlev: IOD, DHV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Bush/Baker
Bush: CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: DLV
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: CT
Gorbachev: strong IOD
to Baker
Bush: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Bush
Scowcroft: DHV
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Bush
Scowcroft: DHV
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Bush
Scowcroft: DHV
Gorbachev: CT

Gorbachev: IOI, CT
Bush: IOD
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Bush
Scowcroft: DHV
Gorbachev: CT
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CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX A
Bush: IOI
Gorbachev: IOI

Baker: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: CT
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Baker
Gorbachev: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Bush: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: IOD to
Shevardnadze

Baker: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: CT
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Baker
Gorbachev: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Bush: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: IOD to
Shevardnadze

Baker: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: CT
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Baker
Gorbachev: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Bush: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: IOD to
Shevardnadze

Baker: DHV, CT
Gorbachev: IOI
Baker: CT
Shevardnadze: IOD to
Baker
Gorbachev: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Bush: IOI to
Shevardnadze
Baker: IOD
Gorbachev: IOD to
Baker
Baker: IOD to
Shevardnadze
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Table 10: Presidential Debate In Richmond VA 1992 Coding
CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX B

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Audience Participants:

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Audience Participants:

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Audience Participants:

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Audience Participants:

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

Perot: IOI, DLV

Perot: IOI, DLV

Perot: IOI, DLV

Perot: IOI, DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Perot: DLV
Audience Participant:
CT
Perot: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Perot: DLV
Audience Participant:
CT
Perot: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Perot: DLV
Audience Participant:
CT
Perot: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Perot: DLV
Audience Participant:
CT
Perot: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DHV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DHV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DHV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DHV

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Audience Participant:

IOD, interrupt

IOD, interrupt

IOD, interrupt

IOD, interrupt

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:

Ms. Simpson: IOD,
interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:

IOD, interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:
N/A
Bush: CT
Audience Participant:
IOD

IOD, interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:
N/A
Bush: CT
Audience Participant:
IOD

IOD, interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:
N/A
Bush: CT
Audience Participant:
IOD

IOD, interrupt
Bush: DLV
Audience Participant:
N/A
Bush: CT
Audience Participant:
IOD

Bush: DLV, interrupt
Audience Participant:

Bush: DLV, interrupt
Audience Participant:

Bush: DLV, interrupt
Audience Participant:

Bush: DLV, interrupt
Audience Participant:

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

IOD, CT

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DLV

Ms. Simpson: N/A
Bush: DLV

Clinton: CT, DHV
Audience Participant:
IOI

Clinton: CT, DHV
Audience Participant:
IOI
Clinton: DHV

Clinton: CT, DHV
Audience Participant:
IOI
Clinton: DHV

Clinton: CT, DHV
Audience Participant:
IOI
Clinton: DHV

Clinton: DHV, CT
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Table 11: Presidential Primary South Carolina 2012 Coding
CODER 1

CODER 2

CODER 3

King: CT
Santorum: IOI
King: N/A
Romney: IOI
King: N/A
Gingrich: IOI
King: N/A
Ron Paul: DLV
King: CT

King: CT
Santorum: IOI
King: N/A
Romney: IOI
King: N/A
Gingrich: IOI
King: N/A
Ron Paul: DLV
King: CT

King: CT
Santorum: IOI
King: N/A
Romney: IOI
King: N/A
Gingrich: IOI
King: N/A
Ron Paul: DLV
King: CT

CODES USED IN
APPENDIX C
King: CT
Santorum: IOI
King: N/A
Romney: IOI
King: N/A
Gingrich: IOI
King: N/A
Ron Paul: DLV
King: CT

Gingrich: IOD, DHV
King: CT
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV
King: CT
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV
King: CT
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV
King: CT
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: DHV, IOD
King: DLV
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: DHV, IOD
King: DLV
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: DHV, IOD
King: DLV
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: DHV, IOD
King: DLV
Gingrich: IOD
King: DLV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV

Gingrich: IOD, DHV
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